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Data Scraping as a Cause of Action: 
Limiting Use of the CFAA and Trespass 
in Online Copying Cases 
Kathleen C. Riley* 
In recent years, online platforms have used claims such as the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”) and trespass to curb 
data scraping, or copying of web content accomplished using 
robots or web crawlers. However, as the term “data scraping” 
implies, the content typically copied is data or information that is 
not protected by intellectual property law, and the means by which 
the copying occurs is not considered to be hacking. Trespass and 
the CFAA are both concerned with authorization, but in data 
scraping cases, these torts are used in such a way that implies that 
real property norms exist on the Internet, a misleading and 
harmful analogy. 
To correct this imbalance, the CFAA must be interpreted in its 
native context, that of computers, computer networks, and the 
Internet, and given contextual meaning. Alternatively, the CFAA 
should be amended. Because data scraping is fundamentally 
copying, copyright offers the correct means for litigating data 
scraping cases. This Note additionally offers proposals for 
creating enforceable terms of service online and for strengthening 
copyright to make it applicable to user-based online platforms. 
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Sylvain, and Joel Reidenberg, as well as Mark Baker and Beth Bruns of Thomson 
Reuters. I am grateful to the dedicated staff of the Fordham IPLJ, and in particular to 
Senior Research & Writing Editor Sean Corrado, for their feedback and advice. I also 
thank Daniel C. Reich for his near-infinite patience and my family and friends for their 
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Imagine you are an economist and want to use an online real 
estate database, Zillow,1 to gather research data on housing prices. 
Rather than gathering data through clicking through the website 
and manually entering data into an excel spreadsheet, you write a 
program called a “bot” or “web crawler” to automatically find and 
copy relevant data.2 Now, instead imagine that you are creating a 
new social media platform, and wish to allow users to pull data 
from their existing social media accounts to fill out their profiles. 
This task is also accomplished with user credentials, provided by 
the user, and a bot or web crawler. In both instances, you have just 
engaged in data scraping, which can violate the Computer Fraud 
and Abuse Act (“CFAA”), a federal anti-hacking statute.3 
Data scraping, also termed screen scraping, web scraping, or 
web crawling, refers to the extraction of data from websites, often 
performed by programs termed “bots,” “spiders,” or “web 
crawlers.”4 While software applications may also be “scraped” for 
their data, online data scraping or web crawling retrieves data that 
is either publicly available or, in the case of social media websites, 
available to registered users.5 
                                                                                                             
1 See About Us, ZILLOW, https://www.zillow.com/corp/About.htm [https://perma.cc/
6ZV4-T3HB] (last visited Sept. 27, 2018). 
2 See Frank Jennings & John Yates, Scrapping Over Data: Are the Data Scrapers’ 
Days Numbered?, 4 J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 120 (2009); Christopher Olston & Marc 
Najork, Web Crawling, 4 FOUND. & TRENDS IN INFO. RETRIEVAL 175, 176, (2010) 
http://infolab.stanford.edu/~olston/publications/crawling_survey.pdf [https://perma.cc
/EV6A-689A]. 
3 Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-474, 100 Stat. 1213 
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012)). 
4 See Jennings &Yates, supra note 2, at 120. Bots and web crawlers are typically used 
when a direct data link or application programming interface (“API”) is unavailable. Web 
APIs often expose parts of an application’s code, allowing programmers to build 
additional functionality on top of that code. See Introduction to Web APIs, MOZILLA, 
https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Learn/JavaScript/Client-side_web_APIs
/Introduction [https://perma.cc/AKR8-6E3X] (last visited Sept. 17, 2018). 
5 See Jennings & Yates, supra note 2, at 128. 
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Though web crawling and scraping of online data have been 
around since the 1990s and are essential to the functioning of 
Internet services,6 recent cases like those of Facebook, Inc. v. 
Power Ventures, Inc.7 and hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp.8 have 
focused on a new problem, that of user data. Power Ventures was a 
social media aggregator that allowed its users to “keep track of a 
variety of social networking friends through a single program”9 by 
using user account information to login to Facebook and “scrape,” 
or automatically copy, users’ Facebook data.10 In December of 
2008, having attracted a growing following,11 and now financially 
backed by a major Silicon Valley capital venture film,12 
Power.com ran a promotion on Facebook,13 which then had about 
145 million active users,14 asking Facebook users to invite their 
friends to Power.com.15 When Facebook became aware of Power’s 
promotional campaign, it sent a cease and desist letter to Power 
and asked Power to sign its developer terms of use agreement.16 
When Power did not comply, Facebook instituted an Internet 
Protocol (IP) address block, and Power changed IP addresses to 
circumvent the block and continued to run its campaign.17 
 Facebook then moved the dispute into the courts, filing an 
action against Power Ventures in the Northern District of 
California alleging that, by scraping its website, Power had, among 
                                                                                                             
6 See Olston & Najork, supra note 2, at 180; see also infra Section I.A. 
7 844 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 313 (2017). 
8 273 F. Supp. 3d 1099 (N.D. Cal. 2017), appeal docketed, No. 17-16783 (9th Cir. 
Sept. 6, 2017). 
9 See Power Ventures, 844 F.3d at 1062. 
10 See id. at 1063. 
11 Id. at 1062. 
12 See The Man Who Stood Up to Facebook, NPR (Oct. 13, 2016, 4:52 PM), 
https://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2016/10/13/497820170/the-man-who-
stood-up-to-facebook [https://perma.cc/5H5M-8UX4]. 
13 Power Ventures, 844 F.3d at 1063. 
14 Ami Sedghi, Facebook: 10 years of social networking, in numbers, GUARDIAN (Feb. 
4, 2014, 9:38 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2014/feb/04/facebook-
in-numbers-statistics [https://perma.cc/QNA8-PCSJ]. 
15 Power Ventures, 844 F.3d at 1063. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
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other things, infringed its copyrights and violated the CFAA.18 
Facebook specifically asserted that by accessing Facebook in 
violation of its terms of use, Power had accessed the website 
“without authorization” or “in excess of authorization” in violation 
of the CFAA.19 In its decision issued in 2016, the Ninth Circuit 
disagreed with this reasoning, but still found that Power had 
violated the CFAA by virtue of continuing to scrape Facebook’s 
website after receiving the cease and desist letter.20 However, as a 
result of the lawsuit, Power had ceased operating in 2011.21 
Determining why Facebook filed its suit requires looking 
beyond its stated rationale, and considering the value Facebook 
places on its exclusive control of user data. In its amended 
complaint, Facebook stated that it was “dedicated to protecting the 
privacy and security of its users” and accused Power of 
“interfering with its relationships with its users.”22 It is difficult to 
accept Facebook’s stated concern with privacy at face value; 
Facebook has been widely criticized for its failure to protect the 
privacy of its users23 and its founder once described privacy as a 
disappearing social norm.24 In addition, Facebook itself uses web 
scraping to create previews of articles shared by users.25 Facebook 
                                                                                                             
18 First Amended Complaint at 1, Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., 252 F. Supp. 
3d (N.D. Cal. 2017), ECF no. 9 [hereinafter First Amended Complaint of Facebook]. 
19 Id. at 18. 
20 See Power Ventures, 844 F.3d at 1067–68. 
21 See id. at 1063. 
22 First Amended Complaint of Facebook, supra note 18, at 2–3. 
23 See e.g., Facebook, Inc.: Analysis of Proposed Consent Order to Aid Public 
Comment, 76 Fed. Reg. 75,883, 75,884 (proposed Dec. 5, 2011) (proposed consent 
agreement); see Julia Angwin et al., Facebook Doesn’t Tell Users Everything It Really 
Knows About Them, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 27, 2016, 9:00 AM), https://www.propublica.org
/article/facebook-doesnt-tell-users-everything-it-really-knows-about-them [https:
//perma.cc/VX5N-CD4K]. In contrast, Power Ventures presented itself as a champion of 
user privacy. See Amended Answer and Counterclaims of Defendants Power Ventures, 
Inc. and Steve Vachani at 1, Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., 844 F. Supp. 2d 
1025 (N.D. Cal. 2012), ECF no. 54 (“Power believes in a borderless Internet where users 
have the right to own and control their own data.”). 
24 See Bobbie Johnson, Privacy no longer a social norm, says Facebook founder, 
GUARDIAN (Jan. 10, 2010 9:58 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2010/jan
/11/facebook-privacy [https://perma.cc/XH4M-EXCG]. 
25 See Facebook’s New Link Previews: What You Need to Know About Creating Your 
Own, MEETEDGAR (Feb. 26, 2018), https://meetedgar.com/blog/facebooks-new-link-
previews-need-know-2018/ [https://perma.cc/C4V3-TWTS]. 
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also allows third-party developers to access Facebook users’ data 
through its developer application programming interfaces 
(“APIs”), and has been criticized for the ability of these developers 
to access extensive amounts of user data contrary to users’ 
expectations of privacy.26 Power’s scraping of Facebook’s website 
also does not precisely appear to have harmed Facebook’s servers, 
as Facebook based its claim of a CFAA loss in the employee time 
spent discovering and attempting to block Power’s activity.27 
Facebook’s behavior suggests that it views its exclusive control of 
user data as key to maintaining its competitive advantage in its 
core business, advertising.28 
Facebook is not alone in pursuing the CFAA as a means of 
eliminating competitors whose business models rely on data 
scraping. Others, including eBay,29 LinkedIn,30 Craigslist,31 and 
Ticketmaster32 have attempted similar legal strategies.33 As a 
result, this Note considers when U.S. law should protect online 
data as proprietary and how courts should handle online data 
scraping cases. It argues that the use of the CFAA and trespass 
claims in data scraping cases are premised on a basic 
misunderstanding of how users access content online and 
                                                                                                             
26 See Elizabeth Dwoskin & Tony Romm, Facebook’s rules for accessing user data 
lured more than just Cambridge Analytica, WASH. POST (Mar. 19, 2018), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/facebooks-rules-for-accessing-user-data-
lured-more-than-just-cambridge-analytica/2018/03/19/31f6979c-658e-43d6-a71f-
afdd8bf1308b_story.html [https://perma.cc/MY2B-QSBL]; Kevin Granville, Facebook 
and Cambridge Analytica: What You Need to Know as Fallout Widens, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 
19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/19/technology/facebook-cambridge-
analytica-explained.html [https://perma.cc/TLV2-LNL2]. Cambridge Analytica, which 
siphoned data from 50 million Facebook users in 2014 and 2015, did so through a survey 
app downloaded by 270,000 users and enabled by one of Facebook’s developer APIs. 
Dwoskin & Romm, supra; Granville supra. 
27 See Facebook Inc.’s Supplemental Brief at 10, Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, 
Inc., 252 F.Supp. 3d 765 (N.D. Cal. 2017) ECF No. 292. 
28 See Reuters, Facebook Now Has an Almost Advertising-Only Business Model, 
FORTUNE (May 5, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/05/05/facebook-digital-advertising-
business-model/ [https://perma.cc/4S29-KH3Z]. 
29 See eBay, Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000). 
30 See hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., 273 F. Supp. 3d 1099 (N.D. Cal. 2017). 
31 See Craigslist, Inc. v. 3Taps, Inc., 964 F. Supp. 2d 1178 (N.D. Cal. 2013). 
32 See Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., No. 99CV-7654, 2000 WL 1887522, at 
*3 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2000), aff’d, 2 F. App’x 741 (9th Cir. 2001). 
33 See generally infra Section I.C. 
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overbroad constructions of both claims. Rather than being 
interpreted using real world norms, CFAA terms like 
“entitle[ment]” and “authorization” should instead be interpreted in 
their native context, that of computers, computer security, and the 
Internet. 
Part I discusses the context in which data scraping occurs, the 
traditional treatment of data by intellectual property law, and how 
various causes of action have played out in data scraping cases. 
Part II offers a framework for evaluating public policies around 
data, and discusses the conflict that occurs when the Internet 
interacts with traditional property law.  Part III proposes a number 
of solutions, including a contextual interpretation of the CFAA and 
amendment. 
I. DATA SCRAPING IN CONTEXT 
This Part places data scraping against a backdrop of other web 
technologies and laws around data. Section I.A discusses online 
data scraping, copying, and hacking within the broader context of 
Internet norms and standards. Section I.B discusses the lack of 
protections for data under U.S. intellectual property law and 
attempts to protect data through other legal means, such as contract 
law. Section I.C explains how trespass to chattels, the CFAA, 
breach of contract, copyright, and antitrust claims have played out 
in data scraping cases. 
A. Data Scraping and Internet Norms 
Copying is essential to the functioning of the Internet.34 When 
a user streams a song on Spotify or watches a movie on Netflix, a 
copy of the song or film is temporarily stored on the computer’s 
random access memory (RAM),35 or cached on or near the central 
processing unit (CPU).36 Caching refers to the storing of data for 
                                                                                                             
34 Mark A. Lemley, The Law and Economics of Internet Norms, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
1257, 1278 (1998). 
35 See Columbia Pictures Indus. v. Bunnell, No. CV 06-1093FMCJCX, 2007 WL 
2080419, at *2 (C.D. Cal. May 29, 2007) (explaining the functioning of RAM). 
36 See United States v. Winkler, 639 F.3d 692, 695 (5th Cir. 2011) (explaining that “a 
video file is copied to a temporary internet cache when the user takes an affirmative 
action such as clicking on the video in order to play it. Thus . . . a video file differs as a 
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potential future requests to reduce the need for duplicate data 
transfers.37 Web browsers cache data from websites, making short-
term copies of the websites’ content and front-end, or user-facing, 
code.38 While storing a work in RAM has been held by courts to 
constitute the copying required for copyright infringement, 
paradoxically caching has been held to be transformative use and 
thus not infringement.39 Copying is also essential to search. The 
Googlebot, a web crawler,40 “fetch[es]” web pages and notes new 
websites and changes to existing websites to create the Google 
index.41 Google also caches these websites, copying them in their 
entirety, and keeping a backup of the website’s content in case it 
becomes unavailable.42 To create Google Books, Google scanned 
                                                                                                             
technological matter from a still photo displayed on a web site, which is downloaded 
automatically to an internet cache when the web page it is displayed on is loaded.”). 
37 See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1169 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(explaining that “[l]ocal caching by the browsers of individual users is noncommercial, 
transformative, and no more than necessary to achieve the objectives of decreasing 
network latency and minimizing unnecessary bandwidth usage (essential to the 
[I]nternet).”). 
38 See Winkler, 639 F.3d at 695–96 (defining internet caching as “where internet 
browser software automatically saved the content of visited websites for the purpose of 
reducing page-loading time if the user revisits the site” and discussing whether caching of 
an internet file constitutes “knowing receipt of electronic child pornography.”); see Dig. 
Assurance Certification, LLC v. Pendolino, No. 6:17-cv-72-ORL-4TBS, 2017 WL 
4342316, at 6 n.5 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 29, 2017) (defining a temporary file cache). 
39 Compare Quantum Sys. Integrators, Inc. v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 338 F. App’x 329, 
337 (4th Cir. 2009) (holding that temporary storage in RAM was copying sufficient for 
copyright infringement) and DocMagic, Inc. v. Ellie Mae, Inc., 745 F. Supp. 2d 1119, 
1148 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (“The Ninth Circuit has held that loading the program into the 
computer’s RAM constitutes an act of ‘copying’ for the purposes of copyright law.”) with 
Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1162 (holding that caching was not copying required to allege 
copyright infringement) and Field v. Google Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1118 (D. Nev. 
2006) (holding that Google search’s caching of copyrighted works was fair use). 
40 Also termed robots or spiders; a web crawler is a piece of software, and like other 
Internet bots, performs automated tasks. The terms web crawling and data scraping are 
used here interchangeably. 
41 See Googlebot – Search Console Help, GOOGLE, https://support.google.com
/webmasters/answer/182072?hl=en [https://perma.cc/HK9V-NK46] (last visited Feb. 26, 
2018). Google offers an opt-out mechanism from inclusion in Google search via 
robots.txt files. See Learn About Robots.txt Files – Search Console Help, GOOGLE, 
https://support.google.com/webmasters/answer/6062608?hl=en [https://perma.cc/MLA4-
TXNY] (last visited Sept. 18, 2018). 
42 See About Cached Links, GOOGLE, https://support.google.com/websearch/answer
/1687222?hl=en&ref_topic=3036132 [https://perma.cc/3Q7F-9WNP] (last visited Feb. 
26, 2018). 
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and made machine-readable more than 20 million books, thus 
making copies of those books in the process.43 
The Googlebot’s web crawling activity is also a form of data 
scraping. Online data scraping, sometimes also termed web 
crawling, is common and has been around since the dawn of the 
Internet.44 Data scraping is generally accomplished using bots, 
which—like the Googlebot—are software programmed to 
complete clearly defined, automated tasks.45 Bots are so common 
online that they are thought to constitute the majority of Internet 
traffic.46 
Like other bots, scraping bots are often programmed to be 
“polite,” meaning that they will note and follow robot exclusion 
headers and robot.txt files, which indicate a website host’s 
preference regarding the presence of bots, and limit their rate of 
requests so as to not impose a burden on the servers of the websites 
they crawl.47 In effect, crawlers act like faster versions of the web 
browsers used by ordinary human users, making HTTP48 requests 
to specific web addresses, or URLs.49 One difference between an 
ordinary user and a data scraping bot is that a bot will not entirely 
render HTML,50 only looking at plain text, whereas a human user 
will allow a website to “load,” rendering the HTML.51 
                                                                                                             
43 See Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 208 (2d Cir. 2015). 
44 See Olston & Najork, supra note 2, at 180. 




47 See Olston & Najork, supra note 2, at 180-81; eBay, Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge, Inc., 100 
F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1061 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (“Programmers who wish to comply with the 
Robot Exclusion Standard design their robots to read a particular data file, ‘robots.txt,’ 
and to comply with the control directives it contains.”). 
48 See HTTP, or HyperText Transfer Protocol, is a protocol by which web clients, like 
browsers and bots, communicate with web servers. See HTTP, MOZILLA, 
https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP [https://perma.cc/S2A4-WFG2] 
(last updated (Sept. 2, 2018, 1:10 AM)). 
49 See Olston & Najork, supra note 2, at 184. A URL, or Uniform Resource Locator, is 
an address for a web resource, like an .html file or .jpg file. See What is a URL?, 
MOZILLA, https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Learn/Common_questions/What_is
_a_URL [https://perma.cc/2TXU-ZW8T] (last updated  May 23, 2018, 2:41 PM). 
50 See HTML, or HyperText Markup Language, is the very basic, simple layer of a 
website that describes and defines its content and layout. See HTML, MOZILLA, https://
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Web crawling and data scraping are often beneficial to both 
services and users. Mint.com offers an example of a relatively 
uncontroversial use of data scraping, and one that is arguably 
beneficial to users.52 To use the service, users give Mint.com their 
account login information for banks and other financial 
institutions, and if a direct data transfer or API is unavailable, 
Mint.com logs in on behalf of the user and scrapes the relevant 
data from the website, and uses the scraped data to show users a 
comprehensive view of their finances.53 When a Facebook user 
posts a link to an article, the user also experiences a beneficial use 
of data scraping, as Facebook scrapes information from the article 
to create a preview that appears on the user’s newsfeed.54 Other 
examples of data scraping abound. Online retailers such as 
Amazon and Walmart often use bots to check their competitors’ 
prices, a form of data scraping.55 Uber is known to have scraped its 
                                                                                                             
developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTML [https://perma.cc/2SZN-P3QV] (last 
updated July 11, 2018, 7:07 AM). 
51 See Hartley Brody, I Don’t Need No Stinking API: Web Scraping for Fun and Profit, 
HARTLEY BRODY (Feb. 3, 2017), https://blog.hartleybrody.com/web-scraping/ [https://
perma.cc/RGX6-23JG]. 
52 See Penny Crosman, The Truth Behind the Hubbub Over Screen Scraping, AM. 
BANKER (Nov. 12, 2015), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/the-truth-behind-the-
hubbub-over-screen-scraping [https://perma.cc/4UTN-DV5E]. 
53 Id. This is very similar on a technical level to the service provided by Power.com. 
See Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., No. 08-cv-5780-LHK, 2013 WL 5372341, at 
*1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2013). Banks have been accused of occasionally blocking 
Mint.com and similar services, and are sometimes said to have done so because they do 
not want to compete with financial aggregators. See Ethan Wolff-Mann, Big Banks Are 
Attacking Personal Finance Apps Like Mint, MONEY (Nov. 9, 2015), 
http://time.com/money/4101961/banks-attack-mint-aggregators/ [https://perma.cc/5L77-
ZV26]. 
54 See News Feed Preview, FACEBOOK, https://developers.facebook.com/docs/instant-
articles/reference/feed-preview [https://perma.cc/7BS7-LBZ6] (last visited Apr. 25, 
2018). 
55 See Khadeeja Safdar, Retailers Try New Pricing Tricks to Battle Amazon on Black 
Friday, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 20, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/retailers-try-new-
pricing-tricks-to-battle-amazon-on-black-friday-1511028271? [https://perma.cc/DN7M-
4PHF]; Jeffrey Dastin, Amazon trounces rivals in battle of the shopping ‘bots’, REUTERS 
(May 10, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-amazon-com-bots-insight/amazon-
trounces-rivals-in-battle-of-the-shopping-bots-idUSKBN1860FK [https://perma.cc/FU92-
W3TT]. 
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competitors’ applications and websites.56 Web crawling, automated 
browsing of websites using a bot, powers Google search and 
Google displays scraped data in its search result previews.57 
Scraped data is used to measure and predict market behavior: 
economists use data scraping to gather research data,58 and hedge 
funds use scraped data as an alternative data set to predict market 
trends.59 Data scraping may also be used in audit testing to 
determine whether a service’s behavior is discriminatory.60 
In addition to their legitimate and beneficial uses, bots, the 
technology used for data scraping, also have malicious uses. 
Commentators often distinguish between “good bots” and “bad 
bots.”61 So-called “bad bots” include spam bots62 and bots that 
impersonate real people, such as the Twitter bots used by Russia in 
                                                                                                             
56 Kate Conger, Uber’s Massive Scraping Program Collected Data About Competitors 
Around the World, GIZMODO (Dec. 11, 2017, 10:03 PM), https://gizmodo.com/ubers-
massive-scraping-program-collected-data-about-com-1820887947 [https://perma.cc/57VJ
-823W]. 
57 See How Search organizes information, GOOGLE, 
https://www.google.com/search/howsearchworks/crawling-indexing/ [https://perma.cc
/Z7WC-KDDJ] (last visited Apr. 25, 2018). 
58 Alberto Cavallo & Roberto Rigobon, The Billion Prices Project: Using Online 
Prices for Measurement and Research, 30 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES, no. 2, at 151, 154 
(Spring 2016). 
59 Lindsay Fortado et al., Hedge Funds See a Gold Rush in Data Mining, FIN. TIMES 
(Aug. 28, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/d86ad460-8802-11e7-bf50-e1c239b45787 
[https://perma.cc/RAG4-EPJY]. 
60 E.g., Sandvig v. Sessions, 315 F. Supp. 3d 1, 9 (D.D.C. 2018) (“One way to 
determine whether members of protected classes are being discriminated against is to 
engage in ‘outcomes-based audit testing.’ [Plaintiffs] . . . are writing a computer program 
that will create bots—automated agents that will each browse the Internet and interact 
with websites as a human user might.”). 
61 See, e.g., Tom Ruff, The Good, Bad and Ugly of ‘Bots’ Online, THE HILL (Sept. 14, 
2017 8:20 AM), http://thehill.com/opinion/technology/350536-the-good-bad-and-ugly-
of-bots-online [https://perma.cc/6K54-7HZA]; see Bot Traffic Report 2016, INCAPSULA 
(Jan. 24, 2017), https://www.incapsula.com/blog/bot-traffic-report-2016.html [https://
perma.cc/EGJ7-NLAT]; see also Branwell Moffat, Good Bots, Bad Bots, And The 
Troublesome Ones In Between, DIGITALIST MAG. (Jun. 21, 2017), http://
www.digitalistmag.com/customer-experience/2017/06/21/good-bots-bad-bots-
troublesome-ones-in-between-05163949 [https://perma.cc/JR5V-2DQ4]; Tamanna 
Mishra, Good Bots Are the Internet’s Worker Bees; Bad Bots Are Out to Get Us—Can 
You Tell Them Apart?, YOURSTORY (Apr. 28, 2017), https://yourstory.com/2017/04
/good-and-bad-bots/ [https://perma.cc/ALL6-DCE3]. 
62 See Mishra, supra note 61. 
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the 2016 election63 or the bots used by scalpers in the online ticket 
resale market.64 Online service providers must also defend 
themselves against botnets, collections of malware-infested 
computers, which can be controlled remotely and used in 
coordinated ways.65 Botnets are used in stealing data and 
passwords, attacking private and public networks, and carrying out 
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks.66 “Good bots” 
include the Googlebot; copyright bots, which look for infringing 
material online;67 Reddit’s moderator bots;68 chat bots used for 
customer service;69 and the bots used by Mint and Facebook.70 
Data scraping itself is often said to be parasitic. Companies 
concerned about scraping of their websites argue, in essence, that 
scrapers are free riders that have misappropriated their content and 
harmed their relationships with their users.71 Craigslist referred to a 
scraper of its website, 3Taps, as “unabashedly mass-harvesting and 
                                                                                                             
63 See Denise Clifton, Twitter Bots Distorted the 2016 Election—Including Many 
Likely from Russia, MOTHER JONES (Oct. 12, 2017, 6:00 AM), 
https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2017/10/twitter-bots-distorted-the-2016-election-
including-many-controlled-by-russia/ [https://perma.cc/826X-BEUQ]; Victor Luckerson, 
The Big, Bad Bot Problem, RINGER (Mar. 8, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://www.theringer.com
/tech/2018/3/8/17093982/twitter-bot-problem [https://perma.cc/ED3B-37XA]. 
64 See Ticketmaster L.L.C. v. Prestige Entm’t, Inc., 306 F. Supp. 3d 1164, 1170–71 
(C.D. Cal. 2018); Jason Koebler, The Man Who Broke Ticketmaster, VICE (Feb. 10, 2017, 
8:00 AM), https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/mgxqb8/the-man-who-broke-
ticketmaster [https://perma.cc/28LH-XRR2]. 
65 Policy Brief: Botnets, INTERNET SOC’Y (Oct. 30, 2015), https://
www.internetsociety.org/policybriefs/botnets/ [https://perma.cc/CA28-FAUS]. 
66 Id. 
67 Mishra, supra note 61. 
68 See AutoModerator, REDDIT, https://www.reddit.com/wiki/automoderator 
[https://perma.cc/UC6Z-RDEL] (last visited Mar. 28, 2018). 
69 See Stuart Dredge, Why Facebook and Microsoft say chatbots are the talk of the 
town, GUARDIAN (Sept. 18, 2016, 6:26 AM), https://www.theguardian.com
/technology/2016/sep/18/chatbots-talk-town-interact-humans-technology-silicon-valley 
[https://perma.cc/XW6R-MHS6]. 
70 See supra notes 52–54. 
71 E.g., Cara Bayles, LinkedIn Tells 9th Circ. Startup’s Bots Hurt Competition, 
LAW360 (Mar. 15, 2018), https://www.law360.com/articles/1022804/linkedin-tells-9th-
circ-startup-s-bots-hurt-competition [https://perma.cc/4G9B-QQGX] (“LinkedIn’s 
attorney . . . told the panel during oral arguments in San Francisco that hiQ Labs Inc. was 
taking a ‘free ride on the business LinkedIn built.’”); Jeffrey Kenneth 
Hirschey, Symbiotic Relationships: Pragmatic Acceptance of Data Scraping, 29 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 897, 920 (2014). 
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redistributing postings entrusted by craigslist users,” and argued 
that this “undermine[d] the integrity of local craigslist 
communities, ultimately harming both craigslist and its users.”72 
LinkedIn referred to a scraper of its website, hiQ, as “flagrantly 
violat[ing] LinkedIn’s privacy commitments and member controls, 
and subvert[ing] the expectations of LinkedIn members.”73 In 
another case, Facebook said a scraper and social media aggregator, 
Power Ventures, interfered in its relationship with its users and 
induced users to provide their Facebook contacts’ email 
addresses.74 
As a result of these concerns, companies often attempt to limit 
scraping of their websites through their terms and conditions. 
Zillow’s terms of use prohibit automated queries, specifically 
“screen and database scraping, spiders, robots, [and] crawlers[,]” 
while making an exception for search engines to the extent their 
scraping is fair use “allowed by applicable copyright law.”75 Etsy’s 
terms of use specifically state, “Don’t Steal Our Stuff,” and assert 
that users “agree not to ‘crawl,’ ‘scrape,’ or ‘spider’ any page” of 
its website.76 Facebook,77 LinkedIn,78 Twitter,79 eBay,80 
                                                                                                             
72 First Amended Complaint at 2, Craigslist, Inc. v. 3Taps, Inc., 964 F. Supp. 2d 1178 
(N.D. Cal. 2013) ECF no. 9. 
73 See LinkedIn Corporation’s Supplemental Brief in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion 
for a Preliminary Injunction at 2, hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., 273 F. Supp. 3d 1099 
(N.D. Cal. 2017), ECF no. 50. 
74 See First Amended Complaint of Facebook at 2, Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, 
Inc., 252 F. Supp. 3d 765 (N.D. Cal. 2017), ECF no. 9. 
75 Terms of Use, ZILLOW, https://www.zillow.com/corp/Terms.htm [https://perma.cc
/7AJP-FFU9] (last visited Feb. 23, 2018). Zillow, however, offers direct downloads of 
certain research data. 
76 See Terms of Use – Our House Rules, ETSY, https://www.etsy.com/legal/terms-of-
use/ [https://perma.cc/P58A-EX5B] (last visited Feb. 27, 2018). While Etsy offers an 
API, its terms also contain a provision prohibiting automated scraping and bots. See API 
Terms of Use, ETSY (Jan. 8, 2017), https://www.etsy.com/legal/api [https://perma.cc
/58AG-98CQ]. 
77 Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, FACEBOOK (Jan. 30, 2015), 
https://www.facebook.com/terms.php [https://perma.cc/2RPY-PKL8] (“[y]ou will not 
collect users’ content or information, or otherwise access Facebook, using automated 
means (such as harvesting bots, robots, spiders, or scrapers) without our prior 
permission”). 
78 See User Agreement, LINKEDIN, https://www.linkedin.com/legal/user-agreement 
[https://perma.cc/92KL-CJ5C] (last visited Apr. 8, 2018) (“You agree that you 
will not: . . . [d]evelop, support or use software, devices, scripts, robots, or any other 
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Craigslist,81 TripAdvisor,82 Expedia,83 IMDB,84 Yelp,85 
Hotels.com,86 and Kickstarter87 all prohibit scraping and bots in 
their terms and conditions, usually with an exception for bots 
which have been granted express permission. 
                                                                                                             
means or processes (including crawlers, browser plugins and add-ons, or any other 
technology or manual work) to scrape the Services or otherwise copy profiles and other 
data from the Services”). 
79 Twitter Terms of Service, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/en/tos [https://perma.cc
/UH3K-MR89] (last visited Feb. 23, 2018) (“crawling the Services is permissible if done 
in accordance with the provisions of the robots.txt file, however, scraping the Services 
without the prior consent of Twitter is expressly prohibited”). 
80 eBay User Agreement, EBAY (Nov. 1, 2017), https://pages.ebay.com/help/policies
/user-agreement.html [https://perma.cc/TE8V-CXVF] (“In connection with using or 
accessing the Services you will not; . . . use any robot, spider, scraper, data mining tools, 
data gathering and extraction tools, or other automated means to access our Services for 
any purpose, except with the prior express permission of eBay”). 
81 Terms of Use, CRAIGSLIST (Dec. 29, 2017), https://www.craigslist.org/about
/terms.of.use.en [https://perma.cc/78RD-QEU7] (“[y]ou agree not to copy/collect CL 
content via robots, spiders, scripts, scrapers, crawlers, or any automated or manual 
equivalent”). 
82 TripAdvisor Website Terms, Conditions and Notices, TRIPADVISOR (Feb. 15, 2018), 
https://tripadvisor.mediaroom.com/us-terms-of-use [https://perma.cc/CB9D-75SY] (“you 
agree not to;  . . .  access, monitor or copy any content or information of this Website 
using any robot, spider, scraper or other automated means or any manual process for any 
purpose without our express written permission”). 
83 Website Terms of Use, EXPEDIA (Feb. 21, 2018), https://www.expedia.com/p/info-
other/legal.htm [https://perma.cc/KHN9-G7XL] (“[y]ou agree not to; . . .  access, monitor 
or copy any content or information of this Website using any robot, spider, scraper or 
other automated means or any manual process for any purpose without our express 
written permission”). 
84 IMDb Conditions of Use, IMDB, https://www.imdb.com/conditions?ref_=ft_cou 
[https://perma.cc/TGR5-CA7B] (last visited Feb. 27, 2018) (“[y]ou may not use data 
mining, robots, screen scraping, or similar data gathering and extraction tools on this site, 
except with our express written consent as noted below”). 
85 Terms of Service, YELP (Nov. 27, 2012), https://www.yelp.com/static?p=tos 
[https://perma.cc/2BMT-DLPC] (“[y]ou also agree not to, and will not assist, encourage, 
or enable others to  . . .  [u]se any robot, spider, site search/retrieval application, or other 
automated device, process or means to access, retrieve, scrape, or index any portion of 
the Site or any Site Content”). 
86 Terms and Conditions, HOTELS.COM (Jan. 18, 2018), 
https://www.hotels.com/customer_care/terms_conditions.html [https://perma.cc/ZC9E-
XMEC] (last visited Feb. 27, 2018) (“you agree not to  . . .  access, monitor or copy any 
content or information of this Website using any robot, spider, scraper or other automated 
means or any manual process for any purpose without our express written permission”). 
87 Terms of Use, KICKSTARTER (Oct. 19, 2014), https://www.kickstarter.com/terms-of-
use?ref=global-footer [https://perma.cc/DWD5-JLWU]. 
2018] DATA SCRAPING AS A CAUSE OF ACTION 259 
 
Companies also often take technical measures to prevent 
scraping of their websites. Measures to detect bots and scrapers 
include monitoring website traffic and looking for unusual traffic 
spikes, users completing repetitive tasks too quickly, and other 
behavior inconsistent with a human user.88 Another common 
defensive measure is CAPTCHA, a “Completely Automated 
Public Turing test to tell Computers and Humans Apart,” an 
automated method of distinguishing bots from humans by asking 
users to complete a task, specifically a task for which humans 
typically outperform computers.89 Internet Protocol (IP) address 
blocking is another common means of countering bots,90 although 
its effectiveness is limited.91 IP addresses are often dynamically 
assigned, meaning that they change over time.92 In addition, IP 
addresses can be “spoofed” to create anonymity, though this 
practice is more dubious.93 
Though companies often oppose scraping of their sites, 
scraping differs from what is generally considered a security 
                                                                                                             
88 See JonasCz, A Guide to Preventing Webscraping, GITHUB (July 30, 2017), https://
github.com/JonasCz/How-To-Prevent-Scraping [https://perma.cc/KL37-AJ3S]; How to 
Prevent Getting Blacklisted While Scraping, SCRAPEHERO, https://www.scrapehero.com
/how-to-prevent-getting-blacklisted-while-scraping/ [https://perma.cc/U2SX-56WZ] (last 
visited Feb. 27, 2018). 
89 Deb Amlen, What the Heck Is That?: CAPTCHA, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 26, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/26/crosswords/what-the-heck-is-that-captcha.html 
[https://perma.cc/CS6Y-ALZE]. 
90 See, e.g., Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., 844 F.3d 1058, 1067 (9th Cir. 
2016), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 313 (2017) (noting that Power Ventures circumvented 
Facebook’s IP address block); Craigslist Inc. v. 3Taps Inc., 964 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1180–
81 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (noting that Craigslist blocked 3Taps’ IP address). 
91 See JonasCz, supra note 88; Bill Brenner, Scraper and Bot Series – When Good Bots 
Go Bad, AKAMAI: SIRT ALERTS BLOG (Mar. 10, 2016 9:00 AM), https://
blogs.akamai.com/2016/03/scaper-and-bot-series—-when-good-bots-go-bad.html 
[https://perma.cc/AK42-7W4C]. 
92 See Static vs. dynamic IP addresses, GOOGLE FIBER, https://support.google.com
/fiber/answer/3547208?hl=en [https://perma.cc/MXU7-ZQDX]. 
93 See Farha Ali, IP Spoofing, 10 INTERNET PROTOCOL J. 2, 3 (2007), https://
www.cisco.com/c/en/us/about/press/internet-protocol-journal/back-issues/table-contents-
38/104-ip-spoofing.html [https://perma.cc/3P9F-54K8]. IP addresses are assigned by 
Internet Service Providers (ISPs). As a result, with cooperation from an ISP, an IP 
address can potentially help identify a specific computer and its user. Individuals 
concerned for their anonymity or privacy will sometimes spoof their IP addresses, 
sometimes in order to conduct illicit activity. However, spoofing may be used for 
legitimate purposes as well, such as performance testing of websites. 
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breach or “black hat” hacking.94 When software engineers and web 
developers design applications and websites, they must anticipate a 
number of common hacks and avoid creating vulnerabilities that 
allow these hacks to occur. Common hacks include cookie 
poisoning, hidden field manipulation, parameter tampering, cross-
site scripting, exploiting backdoor and debug options, HTTP 
response splitting, and SQL injection.95 These attacks often involve 
manipulation of HTTP header information, such as falsifying 
authentication information.96 Many attacks also rely on phishing, 
which can be thought of as any attempt to extract information from 
a user using deceptive practices and social engineering, such as 
copycat websites or fraudulent emails and texts.97 Scrapers, by 
contrast, generally act like normal users.98 
                                                                                                             
94 “White hat” hackers, by contrast, are encouraged to find and report flaws, or bugs, in 
web application code, and are sometimes paid a finder’s fee for doing so. See Nick 
Bilton, Hackers with Enigmatic Motives Vex Companies, N.Y. TIMES (July 25, 2010), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/26/technology/26security.html 
[https://perma.cc/7B79-6NVJ]. 
95 See The Dirty Dozen: Preventing Common Application-Level Hack Attacks, IBM 
(Dec. 2007), ftp://ftp.software.ibm.com/software/rational/web/whitepapers/r_wp
_dirtydozen.pdf [https://perma.cc/E3LT-V6L7]; Sumit Siddharth & Pratiksha Doshi, Five 
Common Web Application Vulnerabilities, SYMANTEC CONNECT (Apr. 27, 2006), 
https://www.symantec.com/connect/articles/five-common-web-application-vulnerabilities 
[https://perma.cc/YMC2-2584]. 
96 See Akash Mahajan, Introduction to HTTP Response Headers for Security, INFOSEC 
INST. (Aug. 13, 2012), http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/http-response-headers/#gref 
[https://perma.cc/7KX8-AA8Y]. 
97 See Phishing, FTC (July 2017), https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0003-
phishing [https://perma.cc/EMY3-D6RT]. 
98 An ordinary user visits a website by clicking a link or typing a Uniform Resource 
Locater (URL), or web address, into a browser. See What is a URL?, ORACLE, 
https://docs.oracle.com/javase/tutorial/networking/urls/definition.html 
[https://perma.cc/N5NK-9SVG] (last visited Mar. 26, 2018). The browser is a client 
making a one-way HTTP request to a web server over TCP/IP and the server responds 
with a one-way response. See an Overview of HTTP, MOZILLA, https://
developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Overview [https://perma.cc/4VVK-
KVL7] (last updated June 24, 2018); A Typical HTTP session, MOZILLA (Mar. 26, 2018), 
https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Session [https://perma.cc/R5J6-
VPT6]. The first HTTP request a human user makes to a website, via a browser, is 
typically a “GET” request, which only retrieves data. See HTTP Request Methods, 
MOZILLA, https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Methods [https://
perma.cc/25UX-S7KP] (last visited May 13, 2018). To scrape a website, a bot will make 
numerous HTTP “GET” requests, parse the website’s code, and store the information its 
programmer has built it to retrieve. See Hartley Brody, Web Scraping References: A 
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B. Traditional Treatment of Data by Law 
Historically, U.S. intellectual property law has not protected 
pure information or facts. The Copyright Act of 1976 protects 
“original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of 
expression,” but this protection does not extend to ideas, concepts, 
discoveries, or facts.99 In Feist Publications v. Rural Telephone 
Service Co., Feist copied telephone directory data from Rural for 
its own, more expansive telephone directory, and Rural sued Feist 
claiming copyright infringement.100 Rural argued that its telephone 
directory was a “compilation,”101 which the Copyright Act defines 
as “a work formed by the collection and assembling of preexisting 
materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in 
such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an 
original work of authorship.”102 Because copyright is about 
expression and originality, the Supreme Court stated that “sweat of 
the brow” does not entitle a work to copyright protection.103 The 
copyright to a compilation of facts, or data, is “thin,” because it 
involves minimal creativity and originality; the specific selection 
and arrangement of those facts may be copyrightable, but the raw 
facts and data themselves are not.104 
In addition, in some instances, works created through copying 
have been found to be fair use. Fair use, originally a judicial 
                                                                                                             
Simple Cheat Sheet for Web Scraping with Python, HARTLEY BRODY (Feb. 18, 2017), 
https://blog.hartleybrody.com/web-scraping-cheat-sheet/ [https://perma.cc/E2U9-CTQU]. 
In essence, a scraping bot is simply a web client, similar to a web browser. 
99 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012); Feist Publ’n, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 
344–45 (1991) (“The most fundamental axiom of copyright law is that ‘[n]o author may 
copyright his ideas or the facts he narrates.’”). 
100 Feist, 499 U.S. at 342–44. 
101 Id. at 341. 
102 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). A compilation includes collective works, “such as a 
periodical issue, anthology, or encyclopedia, in which a number of contributions, 
constituting separate and independent works in themselves, are assembled into a 
collective whole.” Id. 
103 Feist, 499 U.S. at 352–54. The EU has made the opposite policy choice through the 
sui generis right, which rewards substantial investment in data collection. See Council 
Directive 96/9, 1996 O.J. (EC). 
104 See Feist, 499 U.S. at 348–49; David E. Shipley, Thin but Not Anorexic: Copyright 
Protection for Compilations and Other Fact Works, 15 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 91, 95 (2007). 
In contrast, the work on an expressive work, such as a novel, is said to be “thick.” See 
Fleener v. Trinity Broad. Network, 203 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1149 (C.D. Cal. 2001). 
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doctrine, is enshrined in Section 107 of the Copyright Act.105 Use 
of a copyrighted work may be transformative if it “adds something 
new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first 
with new expression, meaning, or message.”106 Because copying is 
so fundamental to the functioning of the Internet107 and is often 
necessary for interoperability of software applications,108 courts 
have sometimes found that online services that involve extensive 
copying—such as search engines—are fair use.109 In Authors Guild 
v. Google, Inc., the Second Circuit held that making digital copies 
of books to enable search, and providing short “snippets” of those 
books, was such a transformative use.110 However, in the same 
court’s decision in Fox News Network, LLC v.  TVEyes, Inc., it 
noted that such transformative use does not extend to redistribution 
of content that denies the copyright holder revenue.111 
Despite copyright’s limited protection of data, certain kinds of 
data are specifically protected by law and certain means of 
obtaining data are limited by law. Various statutes protect medical 
and financial data, but other types of data receive more limited 
protection or none at all.112 For user data, the U.S. offers what is 
termed a “sectoral model,” meaning that “Congress passes 
                                                                                                             
105 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012) (factors to be considered in determining fair use are: 
“(1) purpose and character of the use . . . ; (2) nature of the copyrighted work; (3) amount 
and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for the value of the copyrighted 
work).” 
106 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994). 
107 See supra Section I.A. 
108 See supra Section I.A; see also Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 
1510, 1522–23 (9th Cir. 1992), as amended (Jan. 6, 1993). 
109 See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1166 (9th Cir. 2007). 
110 See Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 216–17 (2d Cir. 2015). 
111 See Fox News Network, LLC v. TvEyes, Inc., 883 F.3d 169, 174 (2d Cir. 2018) 
(“TVEyes’s re-distribution of Fox’s audiovisual content serves a transformative purpose 
in that it enables TVEyes’s clients to isolate from the vast corpus of Fox’s content the 
material that is responsive to their interests, and to access that material in a convenient 
manner. But because that re-distribution makes available virtually all of Fox’s 
copyrighted audiovisual content—including all of the Fox content that TVEyes’s clients 
wish to see and hear—and because it deprives Fox of revenue that properly belongs to the 
copyright holder, TVEyes has failed to show that the product it offers to its clients can be 
justified as a fair use.”). 
112 See Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy in the Information Economy: A Fortress or Frontier 
for Individual Rights?, 44 FED. COMM. L.J. 195, 198, 210 (1992). 
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narrowly tailored laws that barely infringe on the marketplace’s 
role of self-regulation, and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
and the Department of Commerce monitor businesses relying 
primarily on industry standards[.]”113 Many patented inventions 
include a database as a claim element,114 and a new type of 
database, if found to be novel and non-obvious, could theoretically 
be patentable.115 Data that is kept secret, with measures taken to 
protect the secrecy of the data, may be offered protection under 
trade secret law.116 
Negotiated data license agreements are an increasingly 
prevalent means of protecting data through contract law,117 but 
contracts of adhesion—non-negotiated, form contracts, used in 
reoccurring transactions where the parties have unequal bargaining 
power—are also often enforced online.118 In ProCD, Inc. v. 
                                                                                                             
113 See Bradyn Fairclough, Privacy Piracy: The Shortcomings of the United States’ 
Data Privacy Regime and How to Fix It, 42 J. CORP. L. 461, 463 (2016). 
114 See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 9,900,355 (filed Oct. 5, 2016); U.S. Patent No. 9,900,353 
(filed Oct. 5, 2016); U.S. Patent No. 9,900,339 (filed Feb. 27, 2017); U.S. Patent No. 
9,900,162 (filed Nov. 11, 2015). A search of U.S. patents run on February 23, 2018 for 
patents containing the word “database” in at least one claim came up with over 100,000 
search results. 
115 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102–103 (2012). 
116 See 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3) (2012); Molly Hubbard Cash, Keep It Secret, Keep It Safe: 
Protecting Trade Secrets by Revisiting the Reasonable Efforts Requirement in Federal 
Law, 23 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 263, 285–86 (2016); see also Heather Roark Parker, Trade 
Secrets and Patent Protection: The Unlikely Power Couple Under the AIA, 32 SYRACUSE 
J. SCI. & TECH. L. 1, 19–20 (2016). 
117 See Daniel Glazer et. al., Data as IP and Data License Agreements, THOMSON 
REUTERS: PRACTICAL LAW, https://1.next.westlaw.com/Document
/I5f5951a21c8a11e38578f7ccc38dcbee/View/FullText.html? [https://perma.cc/7ZQ3-
PLC6] (last visited Feb. 23, 2018); see Community Data License Agreement, LINUX 
FOUNDATION, https://cdla.io/ [https://perma.cc/Z367-CA45] (last visited Feb. 23, 2018); 
see Bloomberg and Twitter Sign Data Licensing Agreement, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 16, 
2015), https://www.bloomberg.com/company/announcements/bloomberg-and-twitter-
sign-data-licensing-agreement/ [https://perma.cc/8CSX-LWDF]. 
118 E.g., Fagerstrom v. Amazon.com, Inc., 141 F. Supp. 3d 1051, 1056 (S.D. Cal. 
2015), aff’d, Wiseley v. Amazon.com, Inc., 709 F. App’x 862 (9th Cir. 2017). Compare 
William J. Condon, Jr., Electronic Assent to Online Contracts: Do Courts Consistently 
Enforce Clickwrap Agreements?, 16 REGENT U. L. REV. 433 (2004) (discussing the 
enforceability of clickwrap and browserwrap contracts and arguing that both types of 
contracts should be enforceable), with Juliet M. Moringiello & William L. 
Reynolds, From Lord Coke to Internet Privacy: The Past, Present, and Future of the Law 
of Electronic Contracting, 72 MD. L. REV. 452, 470–71 (2013) (arguing that courts are 
increasingly applying traditional notions of notice and assent to online contracts). 
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Zeidenberg—which, like Feist, involved telephone directory 
data—the Seventh Circuit found that a “shrinkwrap” license 
agreement on software protected a compilation of data where 
copyright could not.119 In the Internet era, shrinkwrap licenses, 
which referred to licenses that go into effect when the plastic 
wrapping is taken off a CD-ROM case,120 have been replaced by 
clickwrap and browserwrap licenses.121 A clickwrap license is an 
agreement that goes into effect when a website user is offered 
terms and conditions and clicks “I agree,” while browserwrap 
licenses are terms and conditions that a user is said to have agreed 
to by virtue of using an application (“app”) or website.122 Terms of 
use that appear on a website, such the Zillow and Etsy terms of 
use,123 are an example of a browserwrap license. Clickwrap and 
browserwrap licenses share a defining characteristic: consumers 
almost never read them.124 
Companies rely on other legal means for protecting their data 
as well. Copyright claims have not had particularly success in data 
scraping cases, and as a result proprietors of social media and other 
user-based websites have attempted to prohibit third parties from 
copying their data under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 
(CFAA), state hacking statutes, and the related tort of trespass to 
chattels.125 
                                                                                                             
119 See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1455 (7th Cir. 1996). 
120 Id. at 1449. 
121 See Moringiello & Reynolds, supra note 118, at 461–62. 
122 Id. at 465–67. 
123 See supra Section I.A. 
124 See generally Jonathan A. Obar & Anne Oeldorf-Hirsch, The Biggest Lie on the 
Internet: Ignoring the Privacy Policies and Terms of Service Policies of Social 
Networking Services (Information, Communication & Society, Working Paper, 2016), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2757465 [https://perma.cc/H2RB-
LLYG] (last revised Aug. 18, 2018); hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., 273 F. Supp. 3d 
1099, 1107 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (“It is unlikely, however, that most users’ actual privacy 
expectations are shaped by the fine print of a privacy policy buried in the User 
Agreement that likely few, if any, users have actually read.”); see Aaron Smith, Half of 
Online Americans Don’t Know what a Privacy Policy Is, FACT TANK BLOG (Dec. 4, 
2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/12/04/half-of-americans-dont-know-
what-a-privacy-policy-is/ [https://perma.cc/85Q3-DRJT]. 
125 See infra Section I.C. 
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C. Data Scraping as a Cause of Action 
When companies find the data on their websites and 
applications scraped, they may turn to a number of legal causes of 
action in search of a remedy. These causes of action commonly 
include: (1) trespass to chattels; (2) violations of the Computer 
Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) and state computer crime statutes; 
(3) breach of contract; (4) copyright infringement and violations of 
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA).126 Recently, 
antitrust claims have also come into play in data scraping cases. 
1. Trespass to Chattels 
“A trespass to a chattel may be committed by intentionally . . .  
using or intermeddling with a chattel in the possession of another 
[,]” when “the chattel is impaired as to its condition, quality, or 
value, or . . .  the possessor is deprived of the use of the chattel for 
a substantial time[.]”127 States may have their own formulations of 
trespass specific to intangible property. For example, California 
common law specifically acknowledges trespass to chattels as 
“encompass[ing] unauthorized access to a computer system where 
(1) defendant intentionally and without authorization interfered 
with plaintiff’s possessory interest in the computer system; and (2) 
defendant’s unauthorized use proximately resulted in damage to 
plaintiff.”128 
Trespass to chattels is commonly argued in data scraping cases, 
under the theory that a defendant’s scraping interfered with a 
plaintiff’s use of its website and servers by consuming intangible 
resources such as network and server capacity.129 These harms are 
often acknowledged to be minimal. In eBay v. Bidder’s Edge, a 
                                                                                                             
126 Other causes of action that are less common include trademark infringement and 
other Latham Act related civil actions, misappropriation, unfair competition, intentional 
interference with contractual relationship, interference with prospective business 
advantage, fraud, Sherman Act claims, and trade secret-related claims. 
127 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 217(b), 218(b)–(c) (AM. LAW. INST. 
1965); Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 438 n.58 (2d Cir. 2004). 
128 See Craigslist Inc. v. 3Taps Inc., 942 F. Supp. 2d 962, 980 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
129 See id.; eBay, Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1064–66 (N.D. Cal. 
2000); see also Snap-on Bus. Sols. Inc. v. O’Neil & Assocs., 708 F. Supp. 2d 669, 679 
(N.D. Ohio 2010); Register.com, 356 F.3d at 404. 
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cause about aggregation of auction data, eBay stated that “the load 
on its servers resulting from [Bidder’s Edge’s] web crawlers 
represents between 1.11% and 1.53% of the total load on eBay’s 
listing servers.”130 eBay’s argument was partially metaphorical: 
eBay argued that Bidder’s Edge’s activities “should be thought of 
as equivalent to sending in an army of 100,000 robots a day to 
check the prices in a competitor’s store.”131 The court disagreed 
with the metaphor, but decided that allowing the scraping to 
continue “unchecked . . . would encourage other auction 
aggregators” to crawl eBay’s website, which had the potential 
reduce its performance.132 In addition, despite noting that courts 
rarely grant preliminary injunctions based on ongoing trespasses to 
chattels, the court decided to rely on cases related to real property 
as instructive, again comparing eBay’s website to a physical 
auction house.133 As a result, the court granted eBay a preliminary 
injunction which prohibited Bidder’s Edge from using any robot or 
crawler on eBay’s website without written authorization.134 
2. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 
The CFAA is the primary legal means by which companies 
offering web-based services attempt to block scraping of their 
applications. In 1984, Congress passed its first computer-crime 
statute, the Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act (“CADCFAA”),135 which was soon amended to create 
the CFAA,136 and later expanded to create a civil cause of action 
                                                                                                             
130 See eBay, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1064. Contrast this with Snap-on, 708 F. Supp. 2d at 
679–80, where the scraper program apparently caused enough of a traffic spike that Snap-
On’s website crashed. Snap-On has a very different fact pattern than the other data 
scraping cases. In Snap-On, Snap-On had a negotiated agreement with a third-party, 
Mitsubishi. After a contract dispute with Snap-On regarding data ownership and 
portability, Mitsubishi turned to the defendant O’Neil to scrape Snap-On’s database, 
which was password-protected. Snap-On won at trial. 
131 See eBay, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1065. 
132 Id. at 1066 (emphasis added). 
133 Id. at 1067. 
134 Id. at 1073. 
135 Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CADCFAA) of 
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 2102(a), 98 Stat. 2190 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 
1030 (2012)). 
136 Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-474, 100 Stat. 1213 
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012)). 
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within the CFAA.137 While the CFAA was originally envisioned as 
an anti-hacking or computer trespass statute,138 the language of the 
CFAA is much broader. In data scraping cases, an individual 
typically runs afoul of the CFAA’s civil provisions when he 
“intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or 
exceeds authorized access” and obtains information from that 
computer.139 The computer must be a “protected computer,” a 
computer involved in interstate commerce or communication,140 or 
any computer connected to the Internet.141 The term “exceeds 
authorized access” is defined to mean “to access a computer with 
authorization and to use such access to obtain or alter information 
in the computer that the accessor is not entitled so to obtain or alter 
[.]”142 In addition, to be eligible for a civil remedy, the violation 
must have resulted in certain harms, the most expansive being a 
“loss” to one or more persons of at least $5,000, occurring during 
any one-year period.143 The term loss is defined to include 
reasonable costs to a victim, such as the cost of “responding to an 
offense, conducting a damage assessment, and restoring the data, 
program, system, or information to its condition prior to the 
offense and any revenue lost, cost incurred, or other consequential 
damages incurred because of interruption of service[.]”144 
The key phrases of the CFAA are “without authorization” and 
“exceeds authorized access,” which have been interpreted in 
numerous ways by federal courts and legal scholars. These 
                                                                                                             
137 See S. REP. NO. 104-357, at 11–12 (1996). The civil provision was added in the 1994 
amendment. 
138 See H.R. REP. NO. 98-894, at 8–11 (1984) (“Compounding this is the advent of the 
activities of so-called ‘hackers’ who have been able to access (trespass into) both private 
and public computer systems, sometimes with potentially serious results . . . . For 
example, the motion picture ‘War Games’ showed a realistic representation of the 
automatic dialing and access capabilities of the personal computer.”); S. REP. NO. 99-432, 
at 7 (1986) (“Second, section 2(b) will clarify the present 18 U.S.C. 1030(a)(3), making 
clear that it applies to acts of simple trespass against computers belonging to, or being 
used by or for, the Federal Government.”). 
139 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C) (2012). 
140 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2)(B) (2012). 
141 E.g., United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 859 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that 
“protected computer” refers to “all computers with Internet access”). 
142 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(6) (2012). 
143 18 U.S.C. §§ 1030(c)(4)(A)(i)(I) & (g) (2012). 
144 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(11) (2012). 
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approaches to interpretation of the CFAA include: (1) the agency 
approach; (2) the contract approach; (3) the plain meaning 
approach; (4) the trespass approach; and (5) the code-based 
approach. The agency approach is sometimes applied in 
employment contexts, and looks to whether a user violated the 
duty of loyalty he owes to his employer under agency law.145 It 
rarely applies in the data-scraping context, which often involves 
parties with no legal relationship.146 The contract approach looks to 
whether a user of a website or application violated its terms and 
conditions,147 which often results in enforcement of browserwrap 
and clickwrap contracts.148 The First, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits 
have adopted this approach, along with several district courts.149 
The plain meaning approach looks to the plain meaning of 
“exceeds authorized access,” and has been adopted by the Fourth 
and Ninth Circuits.150 Accordingly, in United States v. Nosal, a 
criminal CFAA case, the Ninth Circuit considered the meaning of 
the phrase, “not entitled so to obtain or alter” and applying the rule 
of lenity, found that “the CFAA does not extend to violations of 
use restrictions” but instead targets “unauthorized procurement or 
alteration of information[.]”151 The computer trespass approach 
acknowledges that the CFAA was intended as a computer trespass 
statute,152 and suggests imposing elements similar to those of 
trespass to determine whether an individual has exceeded 
                                                                                                             
145 See Lee Goldman, Interpreting the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 13 U. PITT. J. 
TECH. L. POL’Y 1, 15 (2012). 
146 See Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., 844 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2016), cert. 
denied, 138 S. Ct. 313 (2017); Craigslist Inc. v. 3Taps Inc., 942 F. Supp. 2d 962 (N.D. 
Cal. 2013); CouponCabin LLC v. Savings.com, Inc., No. 2:14-CV-39-TLS, 2017 WL 
83337 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 10, 2017). Contrast these with a case like United States v. Nosal, 
676 F.3d 854 (9th Cir. 2012), which involved employment, or agency, relationship. 
147 See Goldman, supra note 145, at 6–7; Patricia L. Bellia, A Code-Based Approach to 
Unauthorized Access Under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1442, 1455–56 (2016). 
148 See, e.g., Sw. Airlines Co. v. Farechase, Inc., 318 F. Supp. 2d 435, 439–40 (N.D. 
Tex. 2004) (even if plaintiff’s use agreement was not an enforceable contract, defendant 
knew that its terms prohibited scraping and bots); see Craigslist, Inc. v. Naturemarket, 
Inc., 694 F. Supp. 2d 1039, 1056–57 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (in part because defendants 
violated website terms of use, plaintiff alleged a claim for CFAA violation). 
149 See Goldman, supra note 145, at 7–8. 
150 See id. at 13. 
151 See United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 863–64 (9th Cir. 2012). 
152 See H.R. REP. NO. 98-894, at 10–11 (1984). 
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authorized access.153 Under the code-based approach, originally 
proposed by Orin S. Kerr,154 a user acts without authorization only 
when he circumvents code that regulates access to the protected 
computer.155 However, Kerr has suggested that it is valid to view 
the CFAA as a computer trespass statute.156 
The application of the CFAA in data scraping cases highlights 
the inconsistencies in interpretation of the statute. CollegeSource, 
Inc. v. AcademyOne, Inc., decided in the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania, offers a narrow interpretation of the CFAA applied 
to data scraping.157 CollegeSource accused AcademyOne of 
scraping and republishing college course catalogs and course 
information, which CollegeSource had collected and archived.158 
In evaluating CollegeSource’s CFAA cause of action, the court 
noted that CollegeSource’s materials were available to the public 
and that AcademyOne had not engaged in hacking.159 Although 
CollegeSource had sent AcademyOne a cease and desist letter,160 
the court rejected CollegeSource’s argument that by violating its 
terms of use, AcademyOne had “exceeded authorization,” noting 
that it had previously found those same terms of use unenforceable 
under contract law.161 
Notice is increasingly important in CFAA cases, as illustrated 
by Craigslist Inc. v. 3Taps Inc.,162 which was decided in the 
                                                                                                             
153 See Josh Goldfoot & Aditya Bamzai, A Trespass Framework for the Crime of 
Hacking, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1477, 1483 (2016) (advocates a three-element test for 
unauthorized access: “(1) the entry (or access) violates an express or implied prohibition; 
(2) the violator knew, or should have known, of the prohibition’s existence; and (3) the 
prohibition is material or related to the underlying policy of trespass”). 
154 See Orin S. Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope: Interpreting “Access” and “Authorization” 
in Computer Misuse Statutes, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1596 (2003). 
155 See David J. Rosen, Limiting Employee Liability Under the CFAA: A Code-Based 
Approach to “Exceeds Authorized Access,” 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 737, 747 (2012); 
Bellia, supra note 147, at 1457. 
156 Orin S. Kerr, Norms of Computer Trespass, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1143, 1153–54 
(2016) [hereinafter Computer Trespass]. 
157 See generally CollegeSource, Inc. v. AcademyOne, Inc., No. CIV.A. 10-3542, 2012 
WL 5269213 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 25, 2012), aff’d, 597 F. App’x 116 (3d Cir. 2015). 
158 Id. at *1. 
159 Id. at *4, 14. 
160 Id. at *5. 
161 Id. at *15. 
162 964 F. Supp. 2d 1178 (N.D. Cal. 2013). 
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Northern District of California after Nosal. In 3Taps, the court 
defined the issue as “whether Craigslist had the power to revoke, 
on a case-by-case basis, the general permission it granted to the 
public to access the information on its website.”163 The court noted 
that Craigslist “affirmatively communicated its decision to revoke 
3Taps’ access through its cease-and-desist letter and IP blocking 
efforts.”164 In Facebook, Inc. v. PowerVentures, Inc., decided in 
2016, the Ninth Circuit took up this reasoning, holding that the 
permission of Facebook’s users to access their accounts on 
Facebook’s website was “not sufficient to constitute authorization 
after Facebook issued the cease and desist letter.”165 
CouponCabin LLC v. Savings.com, Inc., a case involving 
coupons and coupon codes, advances an even broader view of 
CFAA liability.166 In CouponCabin, the court noted that CFAA 
liability “may exist in certain situations where a party’s 
authorization to access electronic data—including publicly 
accessible electronic data—has been affirmatively rescinded or 
revoked.”167 However, even though defendant Linfield Media was 
not given actual notice that its access was unauthorized, the court 
found that CouponCabin’s technological blocking measures acted 
as constructive notice.168 
The CFAA is often used as the basis for injunctions of scraping 
activity.169 Under a traditional preliminary injunction analysis, a 
court may consider the public interest, but this does not always 
occur. In Citizens Information Associates, LLC v. 
Justmugshots.com, a case about scraping of mugshots and arrest 
                                                                                                             
163 Id. at 1182. 
164 Id. at 1184. 
165 See Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., 844 F.3d 1058, 1068 (9th Cir. 2016), 
cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 313 (2017). 
166 See CouponCabin LLC v. Savings.com, Inc., No. 2:14-CV-39-TLS, 2017 WL 83337 
(N.D. Ind. Jan. 10, 2017). 
167 Id. at *3. 
168 Id. 
169 See Citizens Info. Assocs., LLC v. Justmugshots.com, No. 1-12-CV-573-LY, 2012 
WL 12874898, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 18, 2012) (“To obtain a preliminary injunction, 
Citizens must demonstrate: (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of its 
claim; (2) a substantial threat of irreparable injury or harm if the injunction is not granted; 
(3) that the threatened injury to Citizens outweighs any harm the injunction might cause 
to D’Antonio; and (4) that granting the injunction will not disserve the public interest.”). 
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records, the court stated that because increased public access to 
this information is arguably in the public interest, it could not grant 
an injunction.170 In EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., a 
case where a scraper bot was used to gather price information, 
which was then used to undercut a competitor’s prices, the First 
Circuit reviewed a district court’s grant of a preliminary 
injunction.171 The case was complicated by the fact that Explorica, 
the scraper, was founded by EF’s former employees, who then 
used proprietary tour codes to assist in the scraping of EF’s 
website.172 The court noted the problem of assessing a CFAA 
“loss,” and determined that the effort and time spent assessing the 
potential damage to EF’s computer systems constituted a loss, 
suggesting that a more narrow definition of loss would “reward 
sophisticated intruders.”173 However, one of the former EF 
employees had arguably breached a confidentiality agreement—it 
is unclear why the court ruled on the CFAA and not this likely 
breach of contract.174 
Critics describe the CFAA as flawed, overbroad, and 
criminalizing ordinary behavior.175 Commentators note that the 
CFAA does not define several of its key terms, including “access” 
and “authorization,”176 and that that the use of the term “computer” 
makes little sense in the Internet context, when content is stored on 
                                                                                                             
170 Id. at *2–3. 
171 EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577, 580 (1st Cir. 2001). 
172 Id. at 579–80. 
173 Id. at 585. 
174 Id. at 583–84. 
175 E.g., Tim Wu, Fixing the Worst Law in Technology, NEW YORKER (Mar. 18, 2013), 
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/fixing-the-worst-law-in-technology 
[https://perma.cc/AJ7M-J6JT]; Tiffany Curtis, Note and Comment, Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act Enforcement: Cruel, Unusual, and Due for Reform, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1813 
(2016); Samantha Jensen, Abusing the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: Why Broad 
Interpretations of the CFAA Fail, 36 HAMLINE L. REV. 81, 83–84 (2013); Jonathan Keim, 
Updating the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 16 ENGAGE, no. 3, at 31, 32–33 (Oct. 
2015), https://fedsoc.org/commentary/publications/updating-the-computer-fraud-and-
abuse-act-1 [https://perma.cc/VR6G-58DK]. 
176 E.g., Andrew T. Hernacki, A Vague Law in A Smartphone World: Limiting the 
Scope of Unauthorized Access Under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 61 AM. U. L. 
REV. 1543, 1554 (2012). 
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many computers and servers via the cloud.177 The CFAA has been 
commonly applied in instances where no actual hacking has 
occurred. In one case, the CFAA was found to apply to an 
employee who deleted all data on his employer-provided computer 
before returning it,178 and in another case, to a local official who 
forwarded another’s emails without permission.179 In another 
instance, prosecutors attempted to use the CFAA to criminalize the 
creation of a fake social media profile in violation of terms of 
service, which was found to violate the void-for-vagueness 
doctrine.180 Password sharing by a former employee was also 
found to be a CFAA violation.181 Noting the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Packingham v. North Carolina, which holds that “to 
foreclose access to social media altogether is to prevent the user 
from engaging in the legitimate exercise of First Amendment 
rights,”182 the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) has even 
suggested that the CFAA is unconstitutional because it chills 
exercise of free speech by making it illegal to conduct certain 
kinds of online research.183 
3. Breach of Contract 
A contract is fundamentally a promise recognized by law as 
enforceable if broken, or breached.184 As courts have noted, the 
Internet “has not fundamentally changed the principles of 
contract.”185 In order to be binding, contracts online still require “a 
‘meeting of the minds’ and a manifestation of ‘mutual assent.’”186 
                                                                                                             
177 Amanda B. Gottlieb, Note, Reevaluating the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: 
Amending the Statute to Explicitly Address the Cloud, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 767, 778–79 
(2017). 
178 See Int’l Airport Ctrs., L.L.C. v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418, 420–21 (7th Cir. 2006). 
179 See Steinbach v. Vill. of Forest Park, No. 06-C-4215, 2009 WL 2605283, at *1, 5–6 
(N.D. Ill. Aug. 25, 2009). 
180 See United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 457–467 (C.D. Cal. 2009). 
181 See United States v. Keys, 703 F. App’x 472, 474 (9th Cir. 2017); accord United 
States v. Nosal, 844 F.3d 1024, 1040–41 (9th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 314 
(2017). 
182 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1737 (2017). 
183 See Sandvig v. Sessions, 315 F.Supp.3d 1, 32 (D.D.C. 2018). 
184 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
185 See Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 403 (2d Cir. 2004). 
186 See Van Tassell v. United Mktg. Grp., LLC, 795 F. Supp. 2d 770, 789 (N.D. Ill. 
2011). 
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However, many courts are increasingly willing to enforce contracts 
of adhesion that appear online, such as clickwrap and browserwrap 
agreements.187 In evaluating these types of contracts, courts 
typically evaluate whether the “structure of the contract or website 
gives users reasonable notice of the terms or requires express 
assent.”188 Online users, however, rarely read terms of service and 
website privacy policies,189 in part because few websites either 
situate their contracts in a manner that encourages users to read 
them or offer terms that can be easily read.190 
Breach of contract arguments are not uncommon in data 
scraping cases.191 An early example of this trend can be found in 
Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., decided in 2000.192 In 
Register.com, the Southern District of New York granted an 
injunction against Verio, a scraper of WHOIS data, under 
Register.com’s breach of contract claim.193 The terms of use in the 
case were a browserwrap agreement, published on the “home page 
of [Register.com’s] Internet website.”194 Though the terms of use 
stated that “[b]y submitting this query, you agree to abide by these 
                                                                                                             
187 See Erin Canino, The Electronic “Sign-in-Wrap” Contract: Issues of Notice and 
Assent, the Average Internet User Standard, and Unconscionability, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 535, 541 (2016); accord AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 346–
47 (2011). 
188 See Canino, supra note 187, at 541. 
189 See Obar & Oeldorf-Hirsch, supra note 124; Debra Cassens Weiss, Chief Justice 
Roberts Admits He Doesn’t Read the Computer Fine Print, A.B.A. J. (Oct. 20, 2010, 
12:17 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/chief_justice_roberts_admits_he
_doesnt_read_the_computer_fine_print [https://perma.cc/7JBJ-KSYP]. 
190 See, e.g., Terms of Use, TICKETMASTER, http://www.ticketmaster.com/h/terms.html 
[https://perma.cc/JS9D-92YZ] (last visited Apr. 11, 2018) (The main page of 
Ticketmaster’s website states, at the very bottom of the page, “By continuing past this 
page, you agree to our Terms of Use.” The terms of use are in small font, 12 pixels, 
which is roughly equivalent to 9 point font, and are around 5000 words long, which 
would take an average reader 25 minutes to read at a speed of 200 words per minute.); 
see Canino, supra note 187, at 554–55; Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay 
in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1178–80 (1983). 
191 See, e.g., Craigslist, Inc. v. Kerbel, No. C-11-3309 EMC, 2012 WL 3166798, at *14 
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2012) (holding that plaintiff stated a claim for breach of contract). See 
generally Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), aff’d as 
modified, 356 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2004). 
192 126 F. Supp. 2d at 238. 
193 Id. at 243, 248 (WHOIS data is information about domain names, and falls under the 
purview of ICANN, which assigns and regulates domain names). 
194 Id. at 245. 
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terms[,]” the defendant argued that “it was not asked to click on an 
icon indicating that it accepted the terms.”195 The court asserted 
that by submitting a WHOIS query, Verio agreed to be bound by 
the terms of use, forming a clickwrap agreement that Verio then 
breached.196 In a similar but more recent case, Craigslist, Inc. v. 
Kerbel, the Northern District of California held that Craigslist had 
alleged a valid contract, stating uncritically that Kerbel assented to 
the terms of use “each time he access[ed] the website.”197 
In other data scraping cases, courts analyzed whether a user 
had actual or constructive notice of a website’s terms of use in 
order to determine whether a contract was formed. In DHI Group, 
Inc. v. Kent, a case about online job boards, the court noted that 
while browserwrap agreements rarely give consumers actual or 
constructive notice, it was plausible that the defendant Oilpro had 
constructive notice because its own website contained the same 
provisions prohibiting use of automated means to download 
data.198 The court also confined its conclusion to cases where both 
parties were sophisticated businesses using browserwrap 
agreements on their websites.199 In College Source, Inc. v. 
AcademyOne, Inc., the court considered a “Copyright and 
Disclaimer” notice located on CollegeSource’s PDF catalogs and 
website, and noting the lack of “essential elements of contract 
formation,” granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant 
on the plaintiff’s breach of contract claim.200 In other cases, the 
issue of whether terms of use were a browserwrap contract was 
raised, but left undecided.201 
Snap-On Business Solutions Inc. v. O’Neil & Associates, Inc. is 
an unusual data scraping case where a party arguably breached a 
                                                                                                             
195 Id. at 248 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
196 See id. 
197 Craigslist, Inc. v. Kerbel, No. C–11–3309 EMC, 2012 WL 3166798, at *14 (N.D. 
Cal. Aug. 2, 2012) (argued over the auto-posting and reposting of classified ads). 
198 See DHI Grp., Inc. v. Kent, No. H–16–1670, 2017 WL 4837730 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 26, 
2017). 
199 Id. 
200 See CollegeSource, Inc. v. AcademyOne, Inc., No. 10–3542, 2012 WL 5269213, at 
*10 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 25, 2012). 
201 E.g., Sw. Airlines Co. v. Farechase, Inc., 318 F. Supp. 2d 435, 441 (N.D. Tex. 
2004). 
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negotiated agreement rather than contract of adhesion, and where 
the plaintiff suffered real harm to its servers and temporary loss of 
service.202 Snap-On and Mitsubishi negotiated a series of 
agreements in which Mitsubishi contributed data such as parts 
catalogs to Snap-On, which provided electronic part catalogs for 
clients in the automotive and heavy equipment industries.203 In 
particular, Mitsubishi agreed in the Web Hosting Agreement to not 
use its access to Snap-On’s website for any purpose other than 
administering user names and passwords to authorized users.204 
However, after Mitsubishi asked Snap-on for a copy of its data 
with Snap-on’s enhancements, which included hot spots, links, and 
photographs, Snap-on refused, and Mitsubishi began to discuss 
creating a new database with O’Neil & Associates.205 O’Neil then 
offered to create a scraping tool to retrieve the data from Snap-
On’s system, and received thirty login credentials from 
Mitsubishi.206 However, O’Neil’s scraping—which was performed 
without rate limiting, or slowing down of requests so as not to 
overwhelm a server—created enormous spikes in Snap-On’s 
website traffic that caused the website to crash.207 It is unclear why 
Snap-On sued O’Neil for breach of contract instead of Mitsubishi, 
but the court found that there was a sufficient dispute of material 
fact to preclude summary judgment on Snap-On’s CFAA, breach 
of contract, and copyright claims.208 
In analyzing CFAA claims, courts often consider whether a 
user violated a website’s terms of use as part of the “exceeds 
authorized access” analysis. In Southwest Airlines Co. v. 
Farechase, Inc., the court stated that regardless of whether 
Southwest’s use agreement was an enforceable contract, the 
defendant had constructive knowledge of the terms, and thus was 
aware its access was unauthorized.209 In Craigslist, Inc. v. 
                                                                                                             
202 708 F. Supp. 2d 669 (N.D. Ohio 2010). 
203 Id. at 672. 
204 Id. at 673. 
205 Id. 
206 Id. at 674. 
207 Id. at 675. 
208 Id. at 678, 683, 686. 
209 See Sw. Airlines Co. v. Farechase, Inc., 318 F. Supp. 2d 435, 439–40 (N.D. Tex. 
2004). 
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Naturemarket, Inc., the court stated that, “Plaintiff alleged that 
Defendants accessed its computers in violation of the TOUs, and 
therefore without authorization” and thus granted the plaintiff 
default judgment on its CFAA claim.210 In contrast, in Cvent, Inc. 
v. Eventbrite, Inc., the court noted that Cvent’s terms of use were 
“not displayed on the website in any way in which a reasonable 
user could be expected to notice them.”211 The court noted that the 
link to access the terms was “buried at the bottom of the first page, 
in extremely fine print” and that the terms themselves were 
“several pages long.”212 
4. Copyright 
In data scraping cases, copyright infringement is often alleged 
and dismissed.213 In Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., a case 
about scraping of ticket and event information, the court denied the 
plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunction on its copyright 
claim, noting that “[t]he major difficulty with many of plaintiff’s 
theories and concepts is that it is attempting to find a way to 
protect its expensively developed basic information from what it 
considers a competitor and it cannot do so.”214 However, parties 
who have registered a copyright on the entirety of their website are 
sometimes allowed to proceed with such claims, based on the 
notion that the organization and arrangement of the information on 
a website is copyrightable.215 In the same Ticketmaster case, in a 
                                                                                                             
210 694 F. Supp. 2d 1039, 1057 (N.D. Cal. 2010); accord CouponCabin LLC v. 
Savings.com, Inc., No. 2:14-CV-39-TLS, 2017 WL 83337, at *5 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 10, 
2017) (holding that because both parties were sophisticated businesses, the browserwrap 
agreement was enforceable). 
211 739 F. Supp. 2d 927, 932 (E.D. Va. Sept. 14, 2010). 
212 Id. at 933. 
213 See, e.g., eBay, Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1072 (N.D. Cal. 
2000) (“BE argues that the trespass claim  . . .  ‘is similar to eBay’s originally filed but 
now dismissed copyright infringement claim’”); see Naturemarket, 694 F. Supp. 2d 
at1056; see also Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., No. 99CV7654, 2000 WL 
1887522, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2000), aff’d, 2 F. App’x 741 (9th Cir. 2001) 
[hereinafter Tickets.com I]; see also Allure Jewelers, Inc. v. Ulu, No. 1:12CV91, 2012 
WL 4322519 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 20, 2012) (dismissing Allure’s copyright claim based on 
late registration). 
214 Tickets.com I, 2000 WL 1887522, at *3. 
215 See, e.g., DHI Group, Inc. v. Kent, No. CV H-16-1670, 2017 WL 4837730, at *4 
(S.D. Tex. Oct. 26, 2017) (“Since Oilpro alleges the entire website, including the page 
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later decision, the court—having accepted that Ticketmaster’s 
website was copyrightable—evaluated Tickets.com’s copying and 
determined that its spidering activity was fair use.216 In Craigslist 
Inc. v. 3Taps Inc., the court noted that Craigslist’s allegation of a 
compilation copyright hinged on its exclusive licenses of its users’ 
posts and held that its terms of use did not involve the writing 
necessary to grant an exclusive license.217 In addition, scrapers, by 
virtue of circumventing an IP block or traffic monitoring software, 
are sometimes found to have potentially violated the DMCA.218 
Copyright is said to be in tension with contract law, and courts 
have sometimes applied the doctrine of preemption to resolve the 
conflict.219 Section 301 of the Copyright Act states that “all legal 
or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights 
within the general scope of copyright . . . are governed exclusively 
by this title . . . .[N]o person is entitled to any such right or 
equivalent right in any such work under the common law or 
statutes of any State.”220 In data scraping cases, claims of copyright 
                                                                                                             
layout and organization of the member profile pages, is part of its registered copyright 
and that DHI published this information on its own website, Oilpro has stated a plausible 
claim for copyright infringement.”); see Naturemarket, 694 F. Supp. 2d at 1056 (granting 
default judgment on Craigslist’s copyright claim); see also Craigslist, Inc. v. Kerbel, No. 
C-11-3309 EMC, 2012 WL 3166798, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2012); Facebook, Inc. v. 
Power Ventures, Inc., No. C 08-5780 JF (RS), 2009 WL 1299698, at *4 (N.D. Cal. May 
11, 2009). However, the “look and feel” of a website itself is generally not copyrightable, 
nor is the underlying CSS; the HTML and CSS together may be copyrightable if 
sufficiently expressive. See Media.net Advert. FZ-LLC v. NetSeer, Inc., 156 F. Supp. 3d 
1052, 1062, 1065–67 (N.D. Cal. 2016). 
216 See Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., No. CV997654HLHVBKX, 2003 WL 
21406289, at *5–6 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2003) (favorably comparing the copying to reverse 
engineering, noting that it was temporary and intended to extract public facts, and 
observed the lack of infringing material on Tickets.com’s website.) [hereinafter 
Tickets.com II]. 
217 Craigslist Inc. v. 3Taps Inc., 942 F. Supp. 2d 962, 973–74 (N.D. Cal. 2013). 
Facebook’s copyright claim was also voluntarily dismissed in its case via Fed. R. Civ. P 
41(A)(1), though the exact reasons why are unclear. See Facebook, Inc. v. Power 
Ventures, Inc., No. 08-CV-05780-LHK, 2017 WL 3394754, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 
2017) (“On February 18, 2011, Judge Ware granted the parties’ stipulation to dismiss 
Facebook’s DMCA claim, copyright and trademark infringement claims, and claims for 
violations of California Business and Professions Code Section 17200.”). 
218 E.g., DHI Grp., 2017 WL 4837730, at *5. 
219 See Guy A. Rub, Copyright Survives: Rethinking the Copyright-Contract Conflict, 
103 VA. L. REV. 1141, 1159 (2017). 
220 See 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2012). 
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preemption are rarely raised and, where they are raised, often 
denied.221 
One data scraping case where preemption was found to apply is 
Cvent, where the district court found that copyright preempted the 
plaintiff’s Virginia Computer Crimes Act (VCCA) claim.222 The 
VCCA is similar to the CFAA, but specifically states as an element 
that violator must obtain “property of services by false pretenses,” 
or embezzle or commit larceny, or convert “the property of 
another.”223 Because the plaintiff’s allegation of the VCCA 
violation was based on copying, the court found that copyright 
preempted the claim.224 In Southwest Airlines, the court found that 
Southwest’s misappropriation claim for “fare, route, and 
scheduling information” was similarly preempted by copyright 
law.225 
5. Antitrust 
Following the Facebook v. Power Ventures decision, a scraper 
of LinkedIn’s website, hiQ, sought a declaratory judgment that it 
was not violating the CFAA or other laws by scraping the site.226 
hiQ’s business model depends on collecting data from LinkedIn 
and analyzing it to provide services to employers, including a 
service called “Keeper” aimed at alerting employers of employees 
who are at risk of being recruited away.227 In May 2017, LinkedIn 
sent hiQ a cease and desist letter telling hiQ to stop scraping its 
website and noting the terms of its user agreement, which prohibit 
                                                                                                             
221 See, e.g., Snap-on Bus. Sols. Inc. v. O’Neil & Assocs., Inc., 708 F. Supp. 2d 669, 
680 (N.D. Ohio 2010) (holding that copyright did not preempt plaintiff’s trespass to 
chattels claim); see3Taps, Inc., 942 F. Supp. 2d at 977 (holding that copyright did not 
preempt plaintiff’s breach of contract claim). 
222 See Cvent, Inc. v. Eventbrite, Inc., 739 F. Supp. 2d 927, 934–35 (E.D. Va. 2010). 
223 Id. at 934 (“The elements of a violation of the VCCA are that the defendant (1) uses 
a computer or computer network; (2) without authority; and (3) either obtains property or 
services by false pretenses, embezzles or commits larceny, or converts the property of 
another.”). 
224 Id. at 935. 
225 See Sw. Airlines Co. v. Farechase, Inc., 318 F. Supp. 2d 435, 440–41 (N.D. Tex. 
2004). 
226 See hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., 273 F. Supp. 3d 1099, 1103–04 (N.D. Cal. 
2017), appeal filed, No. 17-16783 (9th Cir. Sept. 6, 2017). 
227 Id. at 1104. 
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scraping.228 In addition to alleging violations of the CFAA and 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), LinkedIn also 
claimed that hiQ had committed trespass to chattels by scraping its 
website,229 and expressed concern about users’ privacy.230 hiQ, in 
turn, argued that LinkedIn’s decision to block its access to data 
“was made for an impermissible anticompetitive purpose—namely 
that it want[ed] to monetize this data itself with a competing 
product.”231 The court stated that, “the Sherman Act prohibits 
companies from leveraging monopoly power to ‘foreclose 
competition or gain a competitive advantage, or to destroy a 
competitor.’”232 Noting LinkedIn’s market dominance and 
previous contradictory positions regarding user privacy taken in 
other litigation, the court found that the issues raised by hiQ 
supported granting a preliminary injunction.233 The injunction 
prohibited LinkedIn from blocking hiQ’s access to its website 
while the litigation proceeded.234 LinkedIn has since appealed the 
decision to the Ninth Circuit, the same circuit that decided 
Facebook v. Power Ventures. 
II. DATA AND PUBLIC POLICY 
“Technology is neither good nor bad; nor is it 
neutral[.]”235 
This Part discusses public policy justifications for both 
intellectual property and traditional property law and how these 
justifications should be applied to data. Section II.A suggests a 
framework with which to evaluate the success of a public policy 
around data and argues that copyright offers the correct balance of 
incentives. Section II.B discusses the use of trespass and trespass 
                                                                                                             
228 Id. 
229 Id. at 1104–05. 
230 Id. at 1118. 
231 Id. at 1117. 
232 Id. at 1118 (citing Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 377 (1973)). 
233 Id. 
234 Id. at 1120. 
235 See Melvin Kranzberg, Technology and History: “Kranzberg’s Laws,” 27 TECH. & 
CULTURE, no. 3, at 547, 554 (July 1986). 
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metaphors in application CFAA, and argues that these claims rely 
on misleading analogies that treat the Internet as a physical place. 
A. Balancing Exclusive Rights in Data 
Intellectual property law involves many trade-offs, generating 
incentives to create and invent and resulting in occasional tragedies 
in the failure to reward “sweat of the brow.” The U.S. Constitution 
explicitly endorses a utilitarian approach to intellectual property, 
giving Congress the power to “promote the Progress of Science 
and useful Arts” by offering time-limited exclusivity to authors 
and inventors.236 Under this justification, patents incentivize 
invention; copyrights incentivize creative expression; trademarks 
incentivize investment and quality;237 and trade secrets 
disincentivizes certain types of unfair competition.238 The same 
justifications for areas of intellectual property limit their reach: 
utility patents must be useful;239 copyrighted materials must be 
original works of authorship and fixed in tangible medium of 
expression;240 federally-registered trademarks must be distinctive 
and used in interstate commerce;241 and trade secrets must be 
secret.242 A utilitarian analysis considers whether the benefits of a 
policy outweigh its costs, and whether a policy successfully 
achieves its stated objectives. When considering possible 
protection of data, this entails examining the incentives created by 
a policy and its social and economic consequences. 
Lack of protection or exclusivity in certain areas of intellectual 
property law can create negative spaces where innovation and 
                                                                                                             
236 See e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Adam D. Moore, A Lockean Theory of 
Intellectual Property, 21 HAMLINE L. REV. 65 (1997); Eric E. Johnson, Intellectual 
Property and the Incentive Fallacy, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 623, 624 (2012). Lockean 
labor theory and personhood theory offer competing justifications for intellectual 
property, but neither justification is acknowledged as valid by U.S. law. EU law, by 
contrast, recognizes both theories as valid. 
237 See 1 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 3:1 (5th ed. 2018). 
238 See Michael Risch, Why Do We Have Trade Secrets?, 11 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. 
REV. 1, 14–15 (2007). 
239 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
240 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012). 
241 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2012). 
242 18 U.S.C § 1839(3)(A) (2012). 
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competition thrive.243 The fashion and restaurant industries both 
lack comprehensive intellectual property protection for their 
participants’ creations,244 but the industries continue to prosper.245 
The open source movement,246 and lack of intellectual property 
protection for programming languages247 are both essential to 
software development, a thriving industry.248 Lack of protection of 
information and data can also create tragedies where the law fails 
to reward an individual’s investment in research and data 
collection while allowing others exploit the fruits of their labor. 
Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc. offers a compelling 
example of a tragedy caused by copyright’s failure to protect 
facts.249 The plaintiff, Gene Miller, wrote a nonfiction book about 
a kidnapping in which the victim was buried alive, later adapted by 
Universal into a screenplay and TV movie, without crediting or 
compensating Miller.250 Because the book was based in fact, 
despite Miller’s year-and-a-half of original research, the 
information conveyed by the book was not copyrightable.251 The 
same “negative spaces” which enable competition and innovation 
are also home to such tragedies. No matter how much time and 
effort is expended to perfect a recipe, the lists of ingredients and 
                                                                                                             
243 See Elizabeth L. Rosenblatt, A Theory of IP’s Negative Space, 34 COLUM. J. L. & 
ARTS 317, 349 (2011). 
244 See id. at 325–28. 
245 See e.g. Imran Amed, et al., The State of Fashion 2018, MCKINSEY & CO. (Nov. 
2017), https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/mckinsey/industries/retail/our%20insights
/renewed%20optimism%20for%20the%20fashion%20industry/the-state-of-fashion-2018-
final.ashx [https://perma.cc/JH92-S45E]; Hudson Riehle, Restaurant Industry 2017 and 
Beyond, NAT’L REST. ASS’N (May 20, 2017), https://www.restaurant.org/Downloads
/PDFs/Events-Groups/Fast-Casual-Show-State-of-Industry-Presentation-Ma.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/KSS7-37FP]. 
246 See Marcus Maher, Open Source Software: The Success of an Alternative 
Intellectual Property Incentive Paradigm, 10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 
619, 695 (2000). 
247 See Elizabeth G. Lowry, Copyright Protection for Computer Languages: Creative 
Incentive or Technological Threat?, 39 EMORY L.J. 1293, 1306 (1990). 
248 See The $1 Trillion Economic Impact of Software, BSA (June 2016), 
http://softwareimpact.bsa.org/pdf/Economic_Impact_of_Software_Report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3LEU-AGEZ]. 
249 See Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365 (5th Cir. 1981). 
250 Id. at 1367–68. 
251 Id. at 1372. 
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procedures contained in recipes are ultimately not copyrightable.252 
Copying and knock-off brands are rampant in the fashion industry, 
free-riding on the hard work of the original designers,253 enabled 
by the failure of copyright to protect clothing.254 
On the opposite side of the spectrum, too many exclusive rights 
can create a different sort of tragedy. When multiple stakeholders 
are able to exclude others from use of a resource, a tragedy of the 
anticommons emerges.255 In a tragedy of the anticommons, 
property becomes locked into inefficient uses because exclusive 
rights holders create barriers that prevent optimal use.256 In his 
2003 article, Cyberspace as a Place and the Tragedy of the 
Anticommons, Dan Hunter suggests that the network resources that 
constitute the Internet are a form of commons, and in the early 
days of the Internet, the public had free and open access to 
websites; however, as time passed, websites increasingly became 
enclosed.257 
Another concern that arises from allocating too many exclusive 
rights is one of competition and barriers to entry. It is often said 
that Internet’s openness and decentralization was essential to its 
early development.258 But the Internet’s value as a communication 
mechanism, as well the value of widely-adopted user-based 
platforms like Facebook, LinkedIn, and Reddit, is derived partially 
                                                                                                             
252 See, e.g., Publications Int’l, Ltd. v. Meredith Corp., 88 F.3d 473, 480 (7th Cir. 1996) 
(“The identification of ingredients necessary for the preparation of each dish is a 
statement of facts. There is no expressive element in each listing; in other words, the 
author who wrote down the ingredients for ‘Curried Turkey and Peanut Salad’ was not 
giving literary expression to his individual creative labors.”). 
253 See Katy Steinmetz, The Knockoff Economy: How Copying Hurts—and Helps—
Fashion, TIME (Sept. 10, 2012), http://style.time.com/2012/09/10/the-knockoff-economy-
how-copying-hurts-and-helps-fashion/ [https://perma.cc/W5AE-T6KZ]. 
254 See, e.g., Whimsicality, Inc. v. Rubie’s Costume Co., 891 F.2d 452, 455 (2d Cir. 
1989) (“We have long held that clothes, as useful articles, are not copyrightable.”). 
255 See Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition 
from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 623–24 (1998). 
256 See Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as Place and the Tragedy of the Digital Anticommons, 
91 CAL. L. REV. 439, 444 (2003) [hereinafter Cyberspace as Place]. 
257 Id. at 511. 
258 See Lawrence Lessig, Cyberspace’s Architectural Constitution, Lecture given at 
www9 in Amsterdam, Netherlands (June 12, 2000), https://cyber.harvard.edu/works
/lessig/www9.pdf [https://perma.cc/2J5K-KTJB]. 
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from network effects.259 Network effects are phenomena that occur 
when the value of a good or service increases as the number of 
people who use it increases,260 and have been said to create barriers 
to entry261 and encourage monopoly power in technology 
spaces.262 Because users contribute content to user-based services, 
over time they are said to develop a type of “collective inertia” 
tying them to the platform.263 Antitrust law exists in tension with 
intellectual property law, as by its nature, intellectual property law 
offers limited monopolies and antitrust law prohibits 
monopolization.264 
As a result, any policy creating property rights around data 
must balance incentives to create and innovate against potential 
creation of too many property rights, which can stifle innovation 
and competition. To the extent they are expressive and original, 
websites and web applications are works of authorship fixed in a 
tangible medium of expression.265 The New York Times’ copyright 
on its newspaper is no less strong because it is simultaneously 
published in print and online.266 But, copyright does not protect 
facts.267 While a story is created by its author, a fact exists in the 
world, and like a scientific principle, is only discovered.268 
                                                                                                             
259 See Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust and the Internet Standardization Problem, 28 CONN. 
L. REV. 1041, 1045–47 (1996) [hereinafter Antitrust & Internet Standardization]. 
260 See Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic 
Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479, 481 (1998). Network effects are also sometimes called 
positive network externalities. 
261 See Gregory J. Werden, Network Effects and Conditions of Entry: Lessons from the 
Microsoft Case, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 87, 108–09 (2001). 
262 See John T. Soma & Kevin B. Davis, Network Effects in Technology Markets: 
Applying the Lessons of Intel and Microsoft to Future Clashes Between Antitrust and 
Intellectual Property, 8 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 3–4 (2000). 
263 See Antitrust & Internet Standardization, supra note 259, at 1050–51. 
264 See Maureen A. O’Rourke, Striking A Delicate Balance: Intellectual Property, 
Antitrust, Contract, and Standardization in the Computer Industry, 12 HARV. J.L. & 
TECH. 1, 2–3 (1998). 
265 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012). 
266 See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1026 (9th Cir. 2001), as 
amended (Apr. 3, 2001), aff’d sub nom. 284 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2002) (denying Napster 
an implied license based on its argument that the record companies had encouraged 
digital redistribution of their copyrighted works). 
267 See supra Section I.B. 
268 See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 347 (1991) 
(“[F]acts do not owe their origin to an act of authorship. The distinction is one between 
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Because data scraping is essentially a form of copying using 
bots, it falls firmly within the subject matter of copyright law. Data 
scraping and web crawling are fundamentally tools for copying 
information, facts, and data online.269 A scraping bot accesses 
websites and makes copies of those websites, parses the websites’ 
code, and stores information in a database.270 
In data scraping cases, through the language of “authorization,” 
the CFAA is used to assert a right to exclude, one of the bundle of 
rights in property.271 Providers of websites and applications own 
their computers and typically own or have a leasehold estate on 
their servers.272 They also own their intellectual property rights and 
have a license to user content. But unless the content being copied 
is original and expressive, these companies do not own the data 
itself or the underlying information it contains.273 
However, in data scraping cases, companies use the CFAA to 
assert something akin to an exclusive right to data. In one data 
scraping case, the court, discussing the CFAA and citing Feist, 
asked “[w]hy should the copyright symbol, which arguably does 
not protect the substantive information anyway . . . or the provision 
of page-by-page access for that matter, be taken to suggest that 
                                                                                                             
creation and discovery: The first person to find and report a particular fact has not created 
the fact; he or she has merely discovered its existence.”); Melville Nimmer,1 NIMMER ON 
COPYRIGHT § 2.11 (2018). 
269 See supra Section I.A. 
270 See supra Section I.A. 
271 See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982) 
(“The power to exclude has traditionally been considered one of the most treasured 
strands in an owner’s bundle of property rights.”). 
272 Most major websites and web applications are hosted by Amazon Web Services or 
another hosting provider, meaning that these services lease their server space and 
capacity. See generally All Customer Success Stories, AMAZON, https://aws.amazon.com
/solutions/case-studies/all/ [https://perma.cc/7GAA-W3Q8] (last visited Apr. 10, 2018); 
Klint Finley, The Amazon S3 Outage Is What Happens When One Site Hosts Too Much of 
the Internet, WIRED (Feb. 28, 2017, 4:20 PM), https://www.wired.com/2017/02/happens-
one-site-hosts-entire-internet/ [https://perma.cc/B5ES-CU6U]; Mike Williams, Best 
Cloud Hosting Providers in 2018, TECHRADAR (Feb. 1, 2018), https://
www.techradar.com/news/best-cloud-hosting-providers [https://perma.cc/L8ZL-QSES]. 
273 Contra EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577, 583 (1st Cir. 2001) 
(“Explorica’s wholesale use of EF’s travel codes to facilitate gathering EF’s prices from 
its website reeks of use—and, indeed, abuse—of proprietary information that goes 
beyond any unauthorized use of EF’s website”). 
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downloading information at higher speed is forbidden[?]”274 
Plaintiffs in data scraping cases typically allege a “sweat of the 
brow” argument that is rejected by copyright,275 often terming 
scrapers “free riders.”276 Even when CFAA and trespass claims 
rely on arguments about hypothetical damage to servers, the 
fundamental disputes are about copying of data.277 
B. Real Property Metaphors and Trespass Online 
In addition to suggesting that there is an exclusive property 
right in data itself, parties making CFAA and trespass claims also 
argue that the Internet itself is analogous to a physical place. Both 
trespass and the CFAA are concerned with the idea of 
authorization, and litigants opposed to data scraping often suggest 
that there can be something analogous to an unauthorized entry on 
a public website.278 
                                                                                                             
274 See EF Cultural Travel BV v. Zefer Corp., 318 F.3d 58, 63 (1st Cir. 2003). 
275 See supra Sections I.B and I.C. 
276 See, e.g., Appellant’s Opening Brief at 1, hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., No. 17-
16783, 2017 WL 4518160 (9th Cir. Sept. 6, 2017), ECF no. 6 (“This case poses the 
question whether LinkedIn has the right to protect itself from anonymous data-scraping 
“bots” deployed by hiQ—a company that seeks to free ride on the fruits of LinkedIn’s 
labor and investment by scraping massive volumes of data from LinkedIn’s computer 
servers and then repackaging and selling that data to others.”). 
277 See, e.g., Fidlar Techs. v. LPS Real Estate Data Sols., Inc., 810 F.3d 1075, 1078, 
1080 (7th Cir. 2016) (upholding the district court’s granting of summary judgment to 
defendant LPS on plaintiff Fidlar’s CFAA claim, noting that LPS’s web harvester was 
primarily used for copying data, and did not alter the data or disrupt Fidlar’s services); 
see Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 404 (2d Cir. 2004) (“While Verio’s 
robots alone would not incapacitate Register’s systems, the court found that if Verio were 
permitted to continue to access Register’s computers through such robots, it was ‘highly 
probable’ that other Internet service providers would devise similar programs to access 
Register’s data, and that the system would be overtaxed and would crash. We cannot say 
these findings were unreasonable.”). 
278 See, e.g., Plaintiff Craigslist, Inc.’s Opposition to Renewed Motion to Dismiss; 
Response to Brief by Amici Curie, Craigslist, Inc. v. 3Taps, Inc., 964 F.Supp.2d 1178 
(N.D. Cal. 2013) (No. CV 12–03816 CRB), 2013 WL 12308283; Facebook, Inc. v. 
Power Ventures, Inc., 844 F.3d 1058, 1068 (9th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 313 
(2017) (comparing Power Ventures to a person who wants to borrow a friend’s jewelry 
that is held in a safe deposit box at a bank); Craigslist Inc. v. 3Taps Inc., 964 F. Supp. 2d 
1178, 1187 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (“The law of trespass on private property provides a useful, 
if imperfect, analogy. Store owners open their doors to the public, but occasionally find it 
necessary to ban disruptive individuals from the premises.”). 
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Since the 1990s, the tort of trespass has been used in ways that 
rely on fundamental misunderstandings of the subject matter of 
online property rights.279 A typical company providing an online 
service owns its computers as chattel and typically has either a 
property interest or leasehold estate in its servers.280 Its interest in 
its website and code is based on copyright law, and its interest in 
its brand and domain name is based on trademark law. In most 
cases, no other property rights exist. The property rights that do 
exist offer clear claims and remedies. If a person steals a computer 
or a physical hard drive, the claim to be made is the tort of 
conversion.281 If a person copies a work of authorship without 
permission or fair use, the claim is copyright infringement.282 If a 
person harms a computer or denies its possessor of its use, the 
claim is trespass to chattels.283 
Trespass to chattels, however, has been routinely applied in 
cases involving the Internet in ways that imply that cyberspace is a 
place where real property exists.284 As a result, judges have applied 
rules about trespass to land to chattels without the constraints of 
real property law. In a classic trespass to real property case, 
“although a visitor may be an invitee when first entering a home, 
he may be demoted to a licensee or trespasser under certain 
                                                                                                             
279 Many academic articles have been written suggesting that cyber trespass attempts to 
create new property rights, including those explicitly discussed below, and that these new 
property rights are unconstrained and do not belong in means of communication. See e.g., 
Mary Anne Bendotoff & Elizabeth R. Gosse, ”Stay Off My Cyberproperty!”: Trespass to 
Chattels on the Internet, 6 INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 12, 17 (2001); Laura Quilter, The 
Continuing Expansion of Cyberspace Trespass to Chattels, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 421, 
437–42 (2002); Eric J. Feigin, Architecture of Consent: Internet Protocols and Their 
Legal Implications, 56 STAN. L. REV. 901, 931–32 (2004). 
280 Today, few companies maintain their own web servers; instead, most online 
companies lease servers from large cloud hosting providers, such as Amazon Web 
Services (AWS). See supra note 272. 
281 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 222A (AM. LAW INST. 1965). Under New 
York common law, computer files themselves and other intangible property may be 
subject to the tort of conversion, e.g., Thyroff v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 8 N.Y.3d 283, 
292-93 (2007). This rule does not create new rights but merely creates continuity for old 
property rights, and is constrained by the “merger doctrine,” meaning the property must 
be theoretically representable in paper form, such as a stock certificate, a promissory 
note, or a physical client list. Id.at 291–92. 
282 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2012). 
283 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 217 (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
284 See Hunter, supra note 256, at 483–88. 
2018] DATA SCRAPING AS A CAUSE OF ACTION 287 
 
circumstances—such as when an invitation is unequivocally 
revoked.”285 When the metaphor of a cyberspace as a place is 
applied to a website, a user who enters with permission is a 
common law invitee, and when that permission is withdrawn or the 
authorization to enter is exceeded, the user becomes a trespasser.286 
But this analogy is deeply flawed: while computers and servers are 
chattels, they are not real property. 
If courts applied trespass to chattels to computers following the 
traditional constraints of tort law, its use would be significantly 
more limited. A trespass to chattels claim requires intent and use or 
intermeddling with a chattel in possession of another in a manner 
which impairs the chattel or deprives the possessor of its use.287 
Because dispossession includes barring a possessor’s access to 
chattel or destroying a chattel while it is in another’s possession, 
installing ransomware or malware can be reasonably viewed as 
trespass to chattels, because both effectively deny the possessor the 
use of the chattel.288 As this example suggests, trespass to chattels 
requires “substantial” actual harm that is more than theoretical or 
de minimis, a requirement that has not been applied in cyber-
trespass cases.289 The metaphor in eBay of an auction house filled 
with robots ignores the fact that websites are not physical places, 
and additionally overlooks how little of eBay’s traffic came from 
bots.290 Because eBay’s server, like other servers of public 
websites, intentionally communicates with other computers and 
servers, the use or intermeddling element of trespass to chattels is 
difficult to apply.291 How does a bot meet the requirement of use or 
intermeddling when a server is intended for communication with 
the public? It is additionally difficult to see how a bot constituting 
                                                                                                             
285 See Rogers v. Martin, 63 N.E.3d 316, 326 n.4 (Ind. 2016); see Estate of Joshua S. 
Cilley v. Lane, 985 A.2d 481, 486 (Me. 2009) (“A licensee who is asked to leave and 
refuses becomes a trespasser”). 
286 Hunter, supra note 256, at 482. 
287 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 217(b), 218(b)–(c) (AM. LAW. INST. 1965). 
288 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 221(c)–(d) (AM. LAW. INST. 1965). 
289 Steven Kam, Intel Corp. v. Hamidi: Trespass to Chattels and A Doctrine of Cyber-
Nuisance, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 427, 433–35 (2004). 
290 See eBay, Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1067 (N.D. Cal. 2000). 
291 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 217(b), 218(b)–(c) (AM. LAW. INST. 1965). 
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around 1% of traffic would impair the server or deprive eBay of its 
use.292 
However, while trespass claims are still made in data scraping 
cases,293 in recent years CFAA claims—which may be understood 
as computer trespass claims294—have prevailed.295 In Facebook, 
while the court rejected the contract-based approach to the CFAA, 
it embraced a trespass to real property approach by treating the 
cease and desist letter as notice that Power Ventures’ implied 
permission, or authorization, to access Facebook’s website had 
been revoked.296 The same reasoning can be seen in 3Taps, where 
the court recognized Craigslist as having a right to exclude 3Taps 
from its website, one of the essential rights in property.297 
The use of trespass metaphors in CFAA cases has been widely 
criticized in legal scholarship. In Cyberspace as a Place and the 
Tragedy of the Anticommons, Dan Hunter suggests that because 
language shapes perceptions of reality, the cyberspace-as-a-place 
metaphor leads to the application of spatial assumptions online.298 
In the 1990s, we surfed the web, hung out in chatrooms, used 
email addresses, and worried about application backdoors, all 
language reflecting a view of cyberspace as land.299 This use of 
metaphor is particularly damaging when adopted by courts in the 
context of computer and network “trespass.”300 
                                                                                                             
292 See eBay, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1063. 
293 See, e.g., Couponcabin LLC v. Savings.com, Inc., No. 2:14-CV-39-TLS, 2016 WL 
3181826, at *2 (N.D. Ind. June 8, 2016). Facebook, notably, did not allege a claim of 
trespass in its complaint against Power Ventures. First Amended Complaint at 1, 
Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., No. 08-CV-5780-LHK, 2013 WL 5372341 (N.D. 
Cal. Sept. 25, 2013), 2009 WL 3561632. 
294 Goldfoot & Bamzai, supra note 153, at 1482–83 (“the CFAA established that 
‘trespassing’ violated computer owners’ rights”); See e.g., QVC, Inc. v. Resultly, LLC, 
159 F. Supp. 3d 576, 590 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (“Moreover, ‘[t]he general purpose of 
the CFAA was to create a cause of action against computer hackers (e.g., 
electronic trespassers).’”). 
295 See, e.g., Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., 844 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2016), 
cert. denied, 138 
S. Ct. 313 (2017). 
296 Id. at 1067–68. 
297 See Craigslist Inc. v. 3Taps Inc., 964 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1184 (N.D. Cal. 2013). 
298 Hunter, supra note 256, at 477–78. 
299 Id. at 454–55. 
300 Id. at 482. 
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Others have taken a more optimistic view of trespass 
metaphors online. In his 2016 article Norms of Computer Trespass, 
Orin Kerr works within the trespass metaphor, noting the 
importance of social norms to physical trespass and suggesting that 
courts look to Internet norms to rule in online trespass cases.301 He 
argues that courts should apply a presumption of openness to the 
web and view efforts to regulate access such as “terms of use, 
hidden addresses, cookies, and IP blocks  . . .  as merely [sic] speed 
bumps rather than virtual barriers.”302 His test for trespass is a 
bright-line test, drawn when a user (or bot) bypasses an 
authentication requirement.303 In the petition for certiorari of 
Facebook v. Power Ventures, the Cato Institute, writing as amicus 
curiae, suggested applying a landlord-tenant metaphor to the facts 
of the case.304 Cato noted the prevalence of password sharing, and 
suggested that the average Facebook user views himself as a 
tenant, able to invite guests onto the website, without his 
landlord’s, or Facebook’s, permission.305 In hiQ, the court 
analogized LinkedIn’s ban on hiQ accessing its website to a store 
owner banning members of the public from viewing a sign from a 
public sidewalk.306 
When using a metaphor to describe the Internet, it is essential 
to consider the limitations of the analogy when making inferences. 
Public websites, by their nature, require their servers to 
communicate with the computers of their visitors. Any person with 
an Internet connection can make a request from a server and 
receive a response, making the Internet seemingly like a public 
place.  However, a client, like a web browser or bot, which makes 
an HTTP get request to a website is more analogous to a customer 
calling a 1-800 number than to a customer visiting a mall. The 
nature of the interaction is communication, not a physical entry. As 
                                                                                                             
301 See generally Computer Trespass, supra note 156, at 1143. 
302 Id. at 1161. 
303 Id. 
304 See Brief of the Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae Supporting the Petition for 
Certiorari, Power Ventures, Inc. v. Facebook, Inc., No. 16–1105, 138 S.Ct. 313 (2017), 
2017 WL 2391509, *11–12. 
305 Id. 
306 See hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., 273 F. Supp. 3d 1099, 1112–13 (N.D. Cal. 
2017). 
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a result, metaphors that treat the Internet as a place can only be 
applied to the extent the relevant analogy conforms to the 
technology under consideration. 
In contrast to the balance offered by copyright law, the CFAA 
and trespass have been applied in data scraping cases to insinuate 
exclusive rights that are unlimited and nearly absolute. Even 
traditional real property rights are limited by doctrines like 
nuisance and easement, but no comparable limitations exist for the 
CFAA and trespass claims in data scraping cases. 
III. SOLUTIONS 
The problems found in data scraping cases result, in part, from 
a lack of claims tailored to activity online. The CFAA was first 
enacted 1984 prior to widespread use of computers,307 and its 
amendments have primarily served the purpose of expanding its 
use by prosecutors,308 with little focus on its civil causes of action. 
While Internet norms exist in a positive sense,309 they may also be 
normatively created with the help of legislators and judges. As a 
result, this Note proposes both legislative and interpretative 
solutions whenever possible, discussing (1) the CFAA; (2) breach 
of contract; and (3) copyright. 
Specifically, Section III.A argues that the CFAA should be 
interpreted under a plain meaning analysis to reflect a clearer 
understanding about the extent to which any ordinary user is 
“authorized” to access a particular website, and “entitled” to obtain 
information from that website in the context of computers and 
servers. Like other statutes in the information space, the CFAA 
should be amended to contain exceptions; it should also be 
amended with clearer language. Section III.B argues that while 
interpretations of the CFAA often rely on terms of use, we should 
evaluate those terms using contract law, and improve terms of use 
and websites so that users are aware of what they have agreed to. 
Section III.C suggests that data scraping cases are often copyright 
                                                                                                             
307 See generally S. REP. NO. 104-357, at 3 (1996). 
308 See Tiffany Curtiss, Computer Fraud and Abuse Act Enforcement: Cruel, Unusual, 
and Due for Reform, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1813, 1814 (2016). 
309 See supra Section I.A. 
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compilation cases where the copying is enabled by technological 
means, and that copyright could handle these cases using a Feist v. 
Rural analysis and fair use. 
A. The CFAA Should Not Be Used to Penalize Data Scraping 
1. Data Scraping Is Not Encompassed by the Contextual 
Meaning of “Exceeds Authorized Access” 
“The starting point for interpreting a statute is the language of 
the statute itself.”310 In the CFAA, the phrase “exceeds authorized 
access” is defined to mean “to access a computer with 
authorization and to use such access to obtain or alter information 
in the computer that the accessor is not entitled so to obtain or 
alter[.]”311 Though courts commonly apply a more common-sense 
analysis to understanding what it means to exceed authorized 
access,312 under the rule against surplus age, the definition must be 
given meaning or the words lose their effect.313 In addition, by the 
same principle, the idea of exceeding authorized access must differ 
from accessing without authorization. The words of the definition 
of “exceeds authorized access” themselves offer a two-part test: (1) 
first, we examine whether the user accessed a computer with 
authorization; (2) second, we evaluate whether the user used this 
access to obtain or alter information that he or she was not entitled 
to so obtain or alter. However, the meanings of the terms, 
“authorization” and “entitled,” remain unclear. 
To determine plain meanings of words, courts often look to 
dictionary definitions as a starting point, though the results may be 
indeterminate.314 The Oxford English Dictionary defines 
“authorize” as to “[g]ive official permission for or approval to (an 
                                                                                                             
310 See Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 
(1980). 
311 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(6) (2012). 
312 See Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., 844 F.3d 1058, 1067 (9th Cir. 
2016), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 313 (2017) (holding that the lack of permission from 
Facebook to access its website, as indicated by the cease and desist letter, was 
determinative). 
313 See, e.g., Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001). 
314 See Looking It Up: Dictionaries and Statutory Interpretation, 107 HARV. L. REV. 
1437, 1445–46 (1994). 
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undertaking or agent).”315 Merriam Webster defines “authorize” as 
first, “to endorse, empower, justify, or permit by or as if by some 
recognized or proper authority (such as custom, evidence, personal 
right, or regulating power)” and, second, “to invest especially with 
legal authority[.]”316 Authorization is then defined as “the act of 
authorizing[.]”317 Black’s Law Dictionary defines authorization as 
“[o]fficial permission to do something; sanction or warrant” or as 
the “official document granting such permission.”318 In the context 
of the CFAA applied online, few of these definitions appear 
particularly relevant. Ordinary human users do not have legal 
authority to visit websites, nor do they have official permission. 
The Merriam-Webster definition at least indicates that custom may 
play a role in determining whether a user has authorization, and 
that authorization could be similar to the concept of permission. 
However, the ambiguity of a statutory term does not depend 
solely on dictionary definitions, nor can the words of such a term 
be viewed in isolation from one another.319 To determine whether a 
statute is ambiguous, courts look to the language of the statute 
itself, “the specific context in which that language is used, and the 
broader context of the statute as a whole.”320 “[T]he meaning of a 
word  . . .  must be drawn from the context in which it is used.”321 
In short, in statutory interpretation, context matters. 
Authorization has a specific meaning in the context of 
computers and servers. A 1996 Internet Engineering Task Force 
(IETF) publication discusses this meaning, stating that: 
“Authorization refers to the process of granting privileges to 
processes and, ultimately, users. This differs from authentication in 
that authentication is the process used to identify a user. Once 
                                                                                                             
315 Authorize, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/us
/authorize [https://perma.cc/66BD-39Q3] (last visited Mar. 30, 2018). 
316 Authorize, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary
/authorize? [https://perma.cc/DK5K-TGZK] (last visited Mar. 30, 2018). 
317 Id. 
318 Authorization, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). 
319 See Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1081 (2015). 
320 See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997). 
321 See Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 132 (1993). 
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identified (reliably), the privileges, rights, property, and 
permissible actions of the user are determined by authorization.”322 
On a website, an authorization policy defines what a user can 
see and do.323 Thus, on a public website, all users have 
“authorization” to view public resources, or URLs. Authorization 
may be very granular, granting specific individuals and groups 
abilities to read, write, modify, and delete resources.324 This 
version of authorization offers a bright line rule: if a user can view 
a resource without hacking, a user is authorized to view that 
resource. In contrast, a pseudo-public website, one which, like 
Facebook or LinkedIn, uses a login, is said to have an 
“authentication” requirement.325 A user is also authorized if she 
has credentials—typically, a username and password—that grant 
such authenticated access. 
Colloquially, in computer security, when access is described as 
“unauthorized,” it typically means that black-hat hacking has 
occurred, or that a user does not have “credentials” to access an 
online resource such as a website. In another white paper about 
authentication, after noting that one method of authentication can 
be possession of an item, such as a credit card or proximity badge, 
the author states, “[p]ossession based authentication is clearly 
subject to theft or use by an unauthorized individual if lost or 
stolen.”326 In an article describing Cambridge Analytica’s access to 
Facebook, the author states that “[t]here was no unauthorized 
external hacking involved[.]”327 
                                                                                                             
322 Site Security Handbook, IETF NETWORK WORKING GROUP (B. Fraser ed., Sept. 
1997), https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2196 [https://perma.cc/8AGA-CFV7]. 
323 Dave Piscitello, Access Controls, User Permissions and Privileges, ICANN BLOG 
(Jan. 19, 2016), https://www.icann.org/news/blog/access-controls-user-permissions-and-
privileges [https://perma.cc/F62Y-2ACP]. 
324 Id. 
325 I refer to Facebook and LinkedIn as “pseudo-public” because nearly anyone with an 
email address may join these websites, but both have an authentication requirement to 
view specific content. 
326 See Doug Graham, It’s All About Authentication, SANS INST. (Mar. 15, 2003), 
https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/authentication/its-about-authentication-
1070 [https://perma.cc/2GD2-K8S2]. 
327 See Ido Kilovaty, The Cambridge Analytica Debacle Is Not a Facebook “Data 
Breach.” Maybe It Should Be., TECHCRUNCH (Mar. 17, 2018), 
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Even if we accept a looser definition of authorization, the 
dictionary definitions of “authorization” and “authorize” suggest 
that the concept of authorization may be based in norms. Password 
sharing is such a norm. Many households have a shared Netflix or 
Hulu account,328 and spouses often have access to each other’s 
online bank accounts for the purpose of paying bills.329 Companies 
often have an official Twitter account, and until 2015 a shared 
username and password was required for multiple employees to 
have access.330 In addition to the commonality of password 
sharing, the express prohibition of “trafficking” in passwords with 
“intent to defraud” elsewhere in the CFAA suggests that mere 
sharing of passwords without the requisite mens rea is outside the 
CFAA’s scope.331 As a result, users of websites with an 
authentication barrier, such as a login requirement, should be 
considered to have authorization if they access the website with the 
permission of the account holder. 
Courts should adopt this interpretation of “authorization” by 
creating a judicial presumption of authorization in CFAA cases 
involving public websites or valid login information. The 
                                                                                                             
https://techcrunch.com/2018/03/17/the-cambridge-analytica-debacle-is-not-a-facebook-
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Sharing Passwords, TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 17, 2015), https://techcrunch.com/2015/02/17
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331 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(6) (2012) (“Whoever  . . .  (6) knowingly and with intent to 
defraud traffics (as defined in section 1029) in any password or similar information 
through which a computer may be accessed without authorization, if— (A) such 
trafficking affects interstate or foreign commerce; or (B) such computer is used by or for 
the Government of the United States.”). 
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presumption of authorization to access a public website can then 
only be overcome by a showing that a user did not have 
permission—implied or express—to use login credentials or that a 
user “hacked” the website. This presumption of authorization 
would apply no matter whether a defendant is accused of accessing 
a protected computer “without authorization” or in a manner that 
“exceeds authorized access.” 
As a result, the second part of the test for interpreting the 
phrase “exceeds authorized access,” which looks to the meaning of 
“used this access to obtain or alter information he or she was not 
entitled to so obtain or alter” needs to refer to something that 
differs from the concept of authorization based on the canon of 
meaningful variation.332 The word entitled is thus a key word of 
the statutory definition, because the phrase rests on whether an 
individual is “not entitled.” Merriam-Webster defines entitle as “to 
give a title to” or “to furnish with proper grounds for seeking or 
claiming something[.]”333 Black’s Law Dictionary defines “entitle” 
as “[t]o grant a legal right to or qualify for.”334 
Users do not precisely have a “title,” property right, or legal 
right to access websites. However, users do have something 
equivalent to a “lawful entry” onto a public website. If an ordinary 
user were not “entitled” to “obtain” public files on a public 
website, then the CFAA would be so overbroad as to be 
meaningless. In addition, because the CFAA is also a criminal 
statute, an overbroad violation violates the rule of lenity.335 
Because the word “entitled” is not commonly used in the context 
of computers and servers, it is necessary to determine the specific 
meaning of the word in context of the CFAA. 
                                                                                                             
332 The canons of presumption of consistent usage and meaningful variation require 
interpretation of the same or similar terms in a statute in the same way. See Jacob 
Scott, Codified Canons and the Common Law of Interpretation, 98 GEO. L.J. 341, 368–69 
(2010). 
333 Entitled, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary
/entitled? [https://perma.cc/9ZF8-JG38] (last visited Mar. 18, 2018). 
334 Entitle, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). 
335 United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 514 (2008) (“The rule of lenity requires 
ambiguous criminal laws to be interpreted in favor of the defendants subjected to them.”); 
LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1134–35 (9th Cir. 2009) (applying the 
rule of lenity to the CFAA). 
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One word that has a similar meaning to “entitled” is the word 
“privileged.” Both words are concerned with the idea of rights, and 
like an entitlement, a privilege is something that may be granted.336 
In the context of computers and servers, measures used “to 
implement authorization policies are called user access controls, 
user permissions[,] or user privileges.”337 In websites and 
applications with a login requirement, users have privileges to 
specific files, or resources, with authentication protocols that 
restrict access.338 This concept of access controls, permissions, and 
privileges could be used to give specific meaning to the word 
entitled. A user would then violate the second prong of the 
proposed test by using authorized access to obtain or alter 
information he or she did not have permissions or privileges to so 
obtain or alter, based on the technical meanings of the terms 
“permissions” and “privileges.” 
Under this proposed test, a user would then violate the CFAA’s 
“exceeds authorized access” provision by breaching an 
authentication barrier, or by accessing resources she lacked 
privileges or permissions to access. Because this interpretation 
looks to technological access barriers, circumvention measures that 
do not define privileges or permissions or effectively restrict 
access, such as an IP address block or CAPTCHA, would not be 
considered a CFAA violation. This interpretation also rejects the 
idea of applying spatial norms to the Internet. Instead, plaintiffs 
alleging CFAA violations would need to describe the 
authorization, privileges, and permissions granted to users of their 
websites and applications generally, and then contrast the behavior 
of the defendant. 
This proposed test also properly limits the scope of the CFAA 
to hacking. A bot that accesses a website with a user’s permission 
is simply another web client which, like a web browser, is copying 
                                                                                                             
336 Privilege, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (defining privilege as a “special 
legal right, exemption, or immunity granted to a person or class of persons; an exception 
to a duty.”). 
337 Piscitello, supra note 323. 
338 A. Arthur Fisher, Authentication and Authorization: The Big Picture with IEEE 
802.1X, SANS INSTITUTE (Dec. 21, 2001), https://www.sans.org/reading-room
/whitepapers/authentication/authentication-authorization-big-picture-ieee-8021x-123 
[https://perma.cc/UG9R-TRB6]. 
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a website on behalf of the user. Because web crawlers and data 
scraping bots access resources with authorization, privileges, and 
permissions, their activity would not be covered by a narrow 
interpretation of the CFAA. Moreover, scraping is not hacking. To 
the extent hacking “get[s] inside a computer,” or trespasses, then 
hacking refers to, for example, “gaining [unauthorized] access to 
the stored contents of a computer system, gaining access to the 
processing capabilities of a system, or intercepting information 
being communicated between systems.”339 When a bot or crawler 
interacts with a website in a way that is hard to distinguish from a 
human user, courts should find that no CFAA violation has 
occurred. 
The plain-meaning interpretation of the CFAA proposed here is 
very much like a code-based approach, but the focus is on using 
specialized understandings of terms to give clear meaning to the 
words of the CFAA.340 However, the approach proposed here 
allows courts to consider evidence about how ordinary users access 
applications and websites with authorization, and then contrast the 
behavior of an accused CFAA violator. 
2. Data Scraping Rarely Results In A “Loss” 
To be eligible for a civil remedy, a violation of the CFAA must 
have resulted in, at a minimum, a “loss” to one or more persons of 
at least $5,000, occurring during any one-year period.341 “Loss” is 
defined as, “any reasonable cost to any victim, including the cost 
of responding to an offense, conducting a damage assessment, and 
restoring the data, program, system, or information to its condition 
prior to the offense, and any revenue lost, cost incurred, or other 
consequential damages incurred because of interruption of 
service[.]”342 
                                                                                                             
339 Julie J.C.H. Ryan, How Do Computer Hackers “Get Inside” a Computer?, SCI. AM. 
(Aug. 16, 2004), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/how-do-computer-hackers-
g/?print=true [https://perma.cc/7P5V-LTYR]. 
340 See Rosen, supra note 155, at 760 (“Under the proposed code-based approach, an 
employee exceeds authorized access when she (1) encounters a code-based barrier on her 
employer’s computer and then (2) proceeds to use her authorized access to obtain or alter 
information that exists behind the barrier.”). 
341 18 U.S.C. §§ 1030(c)(4)(A)(i)(I) & (g) (2012). 
342 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(11) (2012). 
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In data scraping cases, parties often allege that the “loss” 
occurred from responding to the scraping and determining the 
identity of the scraper.343 The canon of noscitur a sociis344 allows 
us to look at the entire definition to understand the meanings of 
“cost of responding to an offense” and “conducting a damage 
assessment” from these phrases’ associates.345 The rest of the 
definition discusses restoring data and interruption of service, 
implying that “damage” must be more than a little extra traffic on a 
website, and “responding” may require more than setting up an IP 
address block. In data scraping cases, there is rarely an interruption 
of service,346 as creators of data scraping bots often take measures 
to ensure that they are “polite” and behave like ordinary users.347 
In recent years, courts have sometimes recognized that “actual 
disruptions in service, not mere access” is required for CFAA 
“damage.”348 Similar reasoning could be applied to the concept of 
“loss.” Courts should carefully scrutinize the basis of any CFAA 
“loss” in data scraping cases to determine what, if any, harm 
actually occurred. If harm to computers or servers occurred, then 
                                                                                                             
343 E.g., Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., 844 F.3d 1058, 1066 (9th Cir. 
2016), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 313, 199 L. Ed. 2d 206 (2017) (“It is undisputed that 
Facebook employees spent many hours, totaling more than $5,000 in costs, analyzing, 
investigating, and responding to Power’s actions”); EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, 
Inc., 274 F.3d 577, 585 (1st Cir. 2001) (“Appellees unquestionably suffered a detriment 
and a disadvantage by having to expend substantial sums to assess the extent, if any, of 
the physical damage to their website caused by appellants’ intrusion. That the physical 
components were not damaged is fortunate, but it does not lessen the loss represented by 
consultant fees.”). 
344 Noscitur a sociis means “it is known from its associates,” and is a canon of statutory 
interpretation that looks to the meaning of a statutory term based on the words and 
phrases surrounding it. See Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015). 
345 See Graham Cty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. U.S. ex rel. Wilson, 559 U.S. 
280, 287 (2010). 
346 E.g., Power Ventures, 844 F.3d at 1066; CollegeSource, Inc. v. AcademyOne, Inc., 
No. CIV.A. 10-3542, 2012 WL 5269213, at *15 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 25, 2012), aff’d, 597 F. 
App’x 116 (3d Cir. 2015) (holding that while CollegeSource did not assert damage or 
interruption of a computer, it could claim a loss based on “internal investigation of 
AcademyOne’s websites, its hiring of a computer expert, and its subsequent security 
measures.”); EF Cultural Travel, 274 F.3d at 585. 
347 See supra Part I; cf. Snap-on Bus. Sols. Inc. v. O’Neil & Assocs., Inc., 708 F. Supp. 
2d 669, 675–76 (N.D. Ohio 2010) (noting that O’Neil’s software stopped crashing Snap-
On’s website once he limited the rate of requests). 
348 Fidlar Techs. v. LPS Real Estate Data Sols., Inc., 810 F.3d 1075, 1085 (7th Cir. 
2016). 
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the time and resources spent investigating and responding to that 
harm may be properly encompassed by a CFAA loss. 
3. Ultimately, the CFAA Should Be Amended To Clarify its 
Meaning And Add Exceptions And Preemption Provisions 
Even with these limitations, the words of the CFAA are 
generally thought to be overbroad,349 and this notion is supported 
when the CFAA is compared with similar statutes. The DMCA, for 
instance, states that, “[n]o person shall circumvent a technological 
measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under 
this title.”350 The DMCA is a much broader statute than the CFAA, 
but is specifically tailored to protect its underlying property right, 
that of copyright. However, the DMCA also contains numerous 
exceptions, including for reverse engineering,351 and encryption 
research,352 and protection of personal identifiable information 
(“PII”).353 The Stored Communication Act (“SCA”) is also 
concerned with the concept of “authorization” and includes a 
provision for whoever “intentionally exceeds an authorization  . . .  
and thereby obtains, alters, or prevents authorized access” to 
electronic communications.354 Like the DMCA, the SCA also 
contains numerous exceptions, including for providers of 
electronic communications services355 and for required disclosures 
based on court orders.356 Even the Espionage Act, a very broadly 
                                                                                                             
349 See, e.g., Sandvig v. Sessions, 315 F.Supp.3d 1, 25 (D.D.C. 2018) (“By providing 
for both civil and criminal enforcement of websites’ limitless ToS—including 
enforcement by the same entities that write the ToS—a broader reading of the CFAA 
‘would appear to criminalize a broad range of day-to-day activity’ and ‘subject 
individuals to the risk of arbitrary or discriminatory prosecution and conviction,’ raising 
Fifth Amendment concerns.”); see Orin S. Kerr, Vagueness Challenges to the Computer 
Fraud and Abuse Act, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1561, 1561–62 (2010) (“The CFAA has become 
so broad, and computers so common, that expansive or uncertain interpretations of 
unauthorized access will render it unconstitutional.”); see also Wu, supra note 175. 
350 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (2012). 
351 17 U.S.C. § 1201(f) (2012). 
352 17 U.S.C. § 1201(g) (2012). 
353 17 U.S.C. § 1201(i) (2012). PII is any data that can be used to identify an individual, 
such as name, social security number, address, phone number, etc. See Guidance on the 
Protection of Personal Identifiable Information, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, 
https://dol.gov/general/ppii [https://perma.cc/K2CL-WW8B] (last visited Sept. 30, 2018). 
354 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a) (2012). 
355 18 U.S.C. § 2701(c)(1) (2012). 
356 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2012). 
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written law—concerned with “unauthorized possession” and 
whether a person is “entitled to receive” materials related to 
national security357—has been limited over time by courts. Though 
courts have not ruled the Espionage Act to be unconstitutionally 
vague, modern courts often limit the statute’s terms through 
inference.358 In addition, the Espionage Act has been limited in the 
past through First Amendment jurisprudence.359 
The CFAA is not written with any such exceptions, and courts 
have been reluctant to limit the CFAA’s scope thus far. Several 
amendments have been proposed to narrow the scope of the 
CFAA,360 but none has ever made it out of committee.361 At a 
minimum, the CFAA should be amended to contain similar 
exceptions to the DMCA.362 Specifically, the CFAA should 
contain explicit exceptions for copying of data, reverse 
engineering, and security research. The CFAA’s main provisions 
                                                                                                             
357 18 U.S.C. § 793(e) (2012). 
358 See Laura Barandes, A Helping Hand: Addressing New Implications of the 
Espionage Act on Freedom of the Press, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 371, 374 (2007); United 
States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057, 1074 (4th Cir. 1988) (“The defendant would also indict 
the phrase ‘entitled to receive’ as vague. The defendant finds this phrase vague because it 
does not spell out exactly who may ‘receive’ such material. However, any omission in the 
statute is clarified and supplied by the government’s classification system provided under 
18 U.S.C. App. 1 for the protection of the national security and the district judge so 
ruled.”). 
359 See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714–15 (1971). 
360 See, e.g., Active Cyber Defense Certainty Act, H.R. 4036, 115th Cong. (2017) 
(adding provisions permitting “active cyber defense measures”); see Personal Data 
Privacy and Security Act of 2011, S. 1151, 112th Cong. (2011) (adding additional 
penalties related to fraud offenses, defining some computers as “critical infrastructure 
computers,” and limiting section 1030(g)’s applicability to terms of use violations); see 
also Aaron’s Law Act of 2013, H.R. 2454, 113th Cong. (2013). 
361 18 U.S.C. § 1030 was most recently amended in 2008 to add provisions intended to 
combat cyber-extortion. See Identity Theft Enforcement and Restitution Act of 2008, 
Pub. L. 110-326, Title II, §§ 203, 204(a), 205—208, 122 Stat. 3561, 3563 (2008). In 
general, most proposed bills to amend section 1030 made since 2000 seek to broaden the 
CFAA or create additional penalties. See, e.g., Botnet Protection Act of 2016, S.2931, 
114th Congress (2016). Versions of Aaron’s Law were proposed in 2013 and 2015 in 
both the House and Senate and were referred to committee, but no hearings or markup 
sessions were held. See Aaron’s Law Act of 2013, S.1196, 113th Congress (2013); 
Aaron’s Law Act of 2013, H.R.2454, 113th Congress (2013); Aaron’s Law Act of 2015, 
H.R.1918, 114th Congress (2015); Aaron’s Law Act of 2015, S.1030, 114th Congress 
(2015). 
362 17 U.S.C. § 1201(f)–(i) (2012). 
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should also be clarified. Narrow and specific definitions of terms 
such as “authorization” and “access” would help courts limit the 
CFAA’s scope. 
The Electronic Frontier Foundation’s (“EFF”) proposal,363 a 
clarification of Aaron’s Law, is an appropriate amendment of the 
CFAA that would limit its use in data scraping cases. Aaron’s Law 
proposed, along with modifications to the CFAA’s criminal 
penalties, striking the phrase “exceeds authorized access” from the 
CFAA and replacing “without authorization” to “access without 
authorization.”364 The EFF’s modification of Aaron’s Law 
suggests defining “access without authorization” as  
to circumvent technological access barriers to a 
computer, file, or data without the express or 
implied permission of the owner or operator of the 
computer to access the computer, file, or data, but 
does not include circumventing a technological 
measure that does not effectively control access to a 
computer, file, or data.365  
The term “without the express or implied permission” is 
specifically noted to “not include access in violation of a duty, 
agreement, or contractual obligation, such as an acceptable use 
policy or terms of service agreement, with an Internet service 
provider, Internet website, or employer.”366 
However, the EFF’s proposal uses the similar language to the 
DMCA,367 making circumvention of a technological access barrier 
                                                                                                             
363 See CFAA Revisions – Penalties and Access, EFF, https://www.eff.org/document
/eff-cfaa-revisions-penalties-and-access [http://perma.cc/6EGX-VG4N] (last visited Apr. 
1, 2018). 
364 Aaron’s Law Act of 2013, H.R. 2454, 113th Cong. (2013); Aaron’s Law Act of 
2013, S.1196, 113th Cong. (2013). Aaron’s Law, as proposed in 2013, defines access 
without authorization as “(A) to obtain information on a protected computer; (B) that the 
accessor lacks authorization to obtain; and (C) by knowingly circumventing one or more 
technological or physical measures that are designed to exclude or prevent unauthorized 
individuals from obtaining that information.” 
365 CFAA Revisions, supra note 363. 
366 Id. 
367 The DMCA states, “[n]o person shall circumvent a technological measure that 
effectively controls access to a work protected under this title.” See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a) 
(2012). EFF’s proposal defines “access without authorization” as “to circumvent 
technological access barriers to a computer, file, or data without the express or implied 
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the basis of a CFAA violation.368 This language is clarified by the 
statement that circumvention of a technological measure that “does 
not effectively control access to a computer, file, or data” is not a 
CFAA violation.369 The EFF’s proposal would effectively make 
the agency and contract approaches370 to the CFAA obsolete, 
preventing the CFAA from being used to enforce unenforceable 
contracts of adhesion. However, while the phrase “does not 
effectively control access” should require courts to obtain expert 
witness testimony from software engineers and digital security 
professionals, it is possible that a court could hold that an IP 
address block or CAPTCHA effectively controls access to a file or 
data. One possibility to prevent this would be to list examples of 
measures that effectively control access in the statute, such as an 
authentication barrier, and measures that do not, such as an IP 
address block. 
In addition, if the CFAA is reformed, its amendments could 
potentially include a preemption clause that is similar to Section 
301 of the Copyright Act.371 This would help reduce the use of 
trespass as a cause of action in computer misuse cases, as well as 
data scraping cases, and create predictability and stability for 
online service providers. 
B. Online Contracting Can Be Improved 
In data scraping cases, judges often dismiss a clickwrap or 
browserwrap contract as unenforceable, but turn around and decide 
that the same unenforceable terms of service make scraping a 
CFAA violation.372 It is even more common for websites to 
prohibit bots, spiders, and scrapers from their websites in their 
terms of service,373 and users not to have read those terms.374 This 
                                                                                                             
permission of the owner or operator of the computer to access the computer, file, or data, 
but does not include circumventing a technological measure that does not effectively 
control access to a computer, file, or data[,]” see CFAA Revisions, supra note 363. 
368 See CFAA Revisions, supra note 363; 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (2012). 
369 CFAA Revisions, supra note 363. 
370 See supra Section I.C.2. 
371 See supra Section I.C.4. 
372 See supra Section I.C. 
373 See supra Section I.A. 
374 See supra Section I.B. 
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presents a dilemma: contract law requires that users have actual or 
constructive notice of the terms of an agreement,375 but websites 
owners are loath to clearly present readable terms to their users in a 
way that encourages users to read them.376 
Courts have sometimes suggested that, were websites to make 
their terms more accessible, users would more effectively be bound 
by terms of service.377 Online contracts that give users actual or 
constructive notice of terms are, in fact, achievable, and possibly 
through the same technology that enables data scraping, bots. 
Reddit is an example of a platform that effectively gives its users 
constructive notice of terms using moderators and moderator 
bots.378 Reddit’s AutoModerator, a bot, allows human moderators 
to enforce the rules of Reddit and its subreddits, by programming 
the bot to remove inappropriate links as well comments containing 
certain words and phrases and to leave comments on threads noting 
a subreddit’s rules.379 In addition to or in lieu of offering a 
CAPTCHA when a service provider notices bot-like activity, 
websites could offer a short-form agreement that discusses 
prohibited activities. This could apply to other types of prohibited 
activity as well. Facebook, for example, which prohibits hate 
speech and threats in its terms of use, could create a bot that looks 
                                                                                                             
375 See supra Section I.C. 
376 See Alex Hern, I Read All the Small Print on the Internet and It Made Me Want to 
Die, GUARDIAN (Jun. 15, 2015 6:56 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015
/jun/15/i-read-all-the-small-print-on-the-internet [https://perma.cc/LK38-XLRC] 
(“Perhaps the best marker of how little Apple cares about the terms of service it requires 
its users to read can be found several paragraphs down the iCloud terms and 
conditions.”). 
377 See Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc., 763 F.3d 1171, 1179 (9th Cir. 2014) (citations 
omitted) (“While failure to read a contract before agreeing to its terms does not relieve a 
party of its obligations under the contract, the onus must be on website owners to put 
users on notice of the terms to which they wish to bind consumers. Given the breadth of 
the range of technological savvy of online purchasers, consumers cannot be expected to 
ferret out hyperlinks to terms and conditions to which they have no reason to suspect they 
will be bound.”). 
378 See generally REDDIT, https://www.reddit.com/ [https://perma.cc/NV84-CR36] (last 
visited Apr. 2, 2018). 
379 See Moderator, REDDIT, https://www.reddit.com/wiki/automoderator [https://
perma.cc/SBW7-E97L] (last visited Apr. 2, 2018). 
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for those kinds of speech and leaves comments on posts that may 
violate its policy, with a link to its terms of use.380 
In addition, terms of use, which are often unwieldy for 
laypersons and written with legal jargon,381 could be rewritten to 
be shorter and contain links explaining specific policies in detail. 
One service that already approaches an appropriate level of 
readability in its terms of use is Etsy.382 Etsy refers to its terms of 
use as “house rules,” and each paragraph of the terms of use 
contains a short phrase up front, in bold, which summarizes what 
the paragraph is about.383 One paragraph on Etsy’s website states, 
“Don’t Try to Harm Our Systems. You agree not to interfere with 
or try to disrupt our Services, for example by distributing a virus or 
other harmful computer code.”384 Similar to the use of brand 
awareness surveys to prove acquired distinctiveness in trademark 
law,385 surveys could help establish actual or constructive notice in 
online contracting. Such surveys would determine how well 
ordinary users can locate, read, and understand a website’s terms 
of use, and could either be used as evidence during litigation, or to 
help companies better construct their terms of use. 
                                                                                                             
380 See Terms of Service, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/terms.php [https://
perma.cc/AR8D-FRL3] (last visited Apr. 2, 2018). 
381 See, e.g., User Agreement, LINKEDIN, supra note 78 (“TO THE EXTENT 
PERMITTED UNDER LAW (AND UNLESS LINKEDIN HAS ENTERED INTO A 
SEPARATE WRITTEN AGREEMENT THAT OVERRIDES THIS CONTRACT), 
LINKEDIN AND ITS AFFILIATES (AND THOSE THAT LINKEDIN WORKS WITH 
TO PROVIDE THE SERVICES) SHALL NOT BE LIABLE TO YOU OR OTHERS 
FOR ANY INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, CONSEQUENTIAL OR PUNITIVE 
DAMAGES, OR ANY LOSS OF DATA, OPPORTUNITIES, REPUTATION, 
PROFITS OR REVENUES, RELATED TO THE SERVICES (E.G. OFFENSIVE OR 
DEFAMATORY STATEMENTS, DOWN TIME OR LOSS, USE OF, OR CHANGES 
TO, YOUR INFORMATION OR CONTENT”). 
382 See generally ETSY, https://www.etsy.com/ [https://perma.cc/MNP9-YP47] (last 
visited Apr. 2, 2018). 
383 See Terms of Use, ETSY, https://www.etsy.com/legal/terms-of-use/ [https://perma.cc
/6TVM-QQG6] (last visited Apr. 2, 2018). 
384 Id. (emphasis in original). 
385 See, e.g., Nola Spice Designs, L.L.C. v. Haydel Enterprises, Inc., 783 F.3d 527, 546 
(5th Cir. 2015) (“While survey evidence is not required to establish secondary meaning, 
it is ‘the most direct and persuasive way of establishing secondary meaning.’”). 
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C. Copyright Offers the Correct Balance of Incentives and 
Remedies and Should Preempt Equivalent State Law Claims 
1. Many Online Data Scraping Cases Are Simply Post-Feist 
Cases Where Copying Is Enabled by Technological Means 
Copyright law protects fixed works of authorship based on 
originality and expression, and but does not protect factual 
information or data. In data scraping cases, the data involved is 
typically data that would be analyzed as a compilation under 
Feist.386 In the cases decided after Feist, books estimating the fair 
market values of rare coins387 and projecting the values of used 
cars388 were found to be copyrightable, while blank forms, part 
numbers,389 settlement prices of futures contracts,390 a collection of 
recipes,391 and charts of winning numbers in illegal gambling 
operations392 were all denied copyright protection. To be 
copyrightable, a compilation of facts must exhibit subjectivity in 
which facts are included or how they are arranged.393 Online data 
providers may exhibit this kind of subjectivity: for example, Zillow 
offers a feature called the “Zestimate,” Zillow’s “estimated market 
value for an individual home[.]”394 Like books estimating fair 
market values of coins or used cars, this data is likely 
copyrightable, because a subjective judgment call has been made 
in order to create the estimate. 
                                                                                                             
386 See generally, Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991). 
387 CDN Inc. v. Kapes, 197 F.3d 1256, 1260 (9th Cir. 1999). 
388 CCC Info. Servs., Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d 61, 67 (2d Cir. 
1994). 
389 ATC Distribution Grp., Inc. v. Whatever It Takes Transmissions & Parts, Inc., 402 
F.3d 700, 705 (6th Cir. 2005). 
390 See New York Mercantile Exch., Inc. v. IntercontinentalExchange, Inc., 497 F.3d 
109, 114–15 (2d Cir. 2007). 
391 See Tomaydo-Tomahhdo, LLC v. Vozary, 629 F. App’x 658, 661–62 (6th Cir. 
2015). 
392 See Victor Lalli Enterprises, Inc. v. Big Red Apple, Inc., 936 F.2d 671, 673 (2d Cir. 
1991). 
393 See Miriam Bitton, Protection for Informational Works After Feist Publications, Inc. 
v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 21 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 611, 631 
(2011). 
394 See Zestimate, https://www.zillow.com/zestimate/ [https://perma.cc/T6B6-7UUH] 
(last visited Apr. 8, 2018). 
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Post-Feist cases often involve collections of information that 
are similar to the information and data scraped in contemporary 
CFAA cases. For example, Middle America Title Co. v. Kirk395 and 
Fidlar Technologies v. LPS Real Estate Data Solutions, Inc.396 are 
both cases involving real estate title information. Middle America 
was decided using a post-Feist copyright analysis, while Fidlar 
was a CFAA case.397 
Middle America sought copyright protection for a compilation 
of land title data.398 The court stated that Middle America’s failed 
to show that its selection of facts “involved some kind of creative 
spark,” noting that the alleged work “simply contains a list of all 
the facts” with “no creativity . . . shown in the selection.”399 As a 
result, the court denied Middle America copyright protection.400 
By contrast, in Fidlar, LPS copied Fidlar’s real estate title data 
using a “web harvester,” but Fidlar sued for violations of the 
CFAA and trespass to chattels.401 The Seventh Circuit held that the 
downloading of data was not a CFAA violation due to the lack of 
damage, specifically the absence of disruptions in service, but 
noted that Fidlar’s claim and LPS’s intrusion was “trespassory in 
nature.”402 In effect, the court’s ruling suggests that it viewed LPS 
as having accessed Fidlar’s software without authorization, but that 
the lack of resulting damage to the server prevented the CFAA’s 
application.403 
Many other data scraping cases involve similar allegations of 
copying what is essentially factual data, such as auction price 
data,404 domain registration data,405 ticket and event information,406 
                                                                                                             
395 59 F.3d 719 (7th Cir 1995). 
396 810 F.3d 1075 (7th Cir. 2016). 
397 Mid Am., 59 F.3d at 721; Fidlar, 810 F.3d at 1076. 
398 Mid Am., 59 F.3d at 721. 
399 Id. at 723. 
400 Id. 
401 Fidlar, 810 F.3d at 1075–77. 
402 Id. at 1084–85. 
403 See id. 
404 See eBay, Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1061–62, 1073 (N.D. 
Cal. 2000). 
405 See Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), aff’d as 
modified, 356 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2004). 
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and arrest records.407 Instead of being litigated under the CFAA, 
these cases should be decided under a Feist analysis, resulting in 
outcomes which would reflect copyright’s careful balance of 
incentives.408 
2. In Cases Where the Content Being Scraped Is Expressive, 
We Should Allow User-Based Services to Sue On Behalf 
of Their Users 
Some compilations involved in online data scraping cases, such 
as LinkedIn, Craigslist, and Facebook, involve what are arguably 
creative works authored by users. These services’ cases have not 
thus far been decided on copyright issues because these services 
have non-exclusive licenses to user content.409 It is well-
established law that “[a] non-exclusive license conveys no 
ownership interest, and the holder of a nonexclusive license may 
not sue others for infringement.”410 An exclusive license requires a 
writing, and in Craigslist Inc. v. 3Taps Inc., the court held that 
Craigslist’s terms of use did not constitute the required writing.411 
                                                                                                             
406 Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., No. 99CV7654, 2000 WL 1887522 (C.D. 
Cal. Aug. 10, 2000), aff’d, 2 F. App’x 741 (9th Cir. 2001). 
407 Citizens Info. Assocs., LLC v. Justmugshots.com, No. 1-12-CV-573-LY, 2012 WL 
12874898 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 18, 2012). 
408 See supra Section I.B. 
409 See Linkedin User Agreement, supra note 78 (“ . . . you own the content and 
information that you submit or post to the Services and you are only granting LinkedIn 
and our affiliates the following non-exclusive license: A worldwide, transferable and 
sublicensable right to use, copy, modify, distribute, publish, and process, information and 
content that you provide through our Services, without any further consent, notice and/or 
compensation to you or others.”); Facebook Terms of Service, 
https://www.facebook.com/terms.php [https://perma.cc/W74Z-RL7A] (last visited Apr. 
8, 2018) (“you grant us a non-exclusive, transferable, sub-licensable, royalty-free, 
worldwide license to use any IP content that you post on or in connection with 
Facebook”); Craigslist Term of Use, https://www.craigslist.org/about/terms.of.use 
[https://perma.cc/7A6E-5T7H] (last visited Apr. 8, 2018) (“You grant us a perpetual, 
irrevocable, unlimited, worldwide, fully paid/sublicensable license to use, copy, display, 
distribute, and make derivative works from content you post”). 
410 See Melville Nimmer, 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 3.05 (2018) (“if the copyright 
owner  . . .  is merely a nonexclusive licensee  . . . then if an infringer copies  . . .  the 
copyright owner  . . .  will not have standing to sue for the infringement”); Davis v. Blige, 
505 F.3d 90, 101 (2d Cir. 2007). 
411 Craigslist Inc. v. 3Taps Inc., 942 F. Supp. 2d 962, 973–74 (N.D. Cal. 2013). 
Facebook’s copyright claim was also voluntarily dismissed in its case via Fed. R. Civ. P 
41(A)(1), though the exact reasons why are unclear. See Facebook, Inc. v. Power 
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The lack of standing in copyright infringement lawsuits for 
user-based services explains why services like Facebook and 
LinkedIn have resorted to the CFAA as a potential remedy for 
copying of their websites.412 While Power Ventures, for example, 
had either an express or implied license to its users content, it did 
not have such a license to their friends’ content and arguably 
infringed some Facebook users’ copyrights.413 Facebook likely did 
not have standing to sue for copyright infringement, even though 
its arrangement and selection of user posts in a user’s newsfeed is 
arguably expressive. hiQ’s service is potentially harmful to 
LinkedIn users’ privacy, but LinkedIn also lacks standing to sue 
based on copyright infringement. It seems likely that social media 
users would balk at giving services the exclusive licenses that 
would permit user-based services to sue for copyright 
infringement. 
One solution to this problem would be to allow user-based 
services to sue on behalf of their users in derivative form,414 or for 
social media companies faced with data scraping to hire attorneys 
to file class actions on behalf of their users. Obtaining class 
certification in copyright cases is often very difficult,415 but users 
of a single social media service whose content has been copied 
may be more likely to meet the standards of class action 
certification under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.416 
                                                                                                             
Ventures, Inc., No. 08-CV-05780-LHK, 2017 WL 3394754, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 
2017) (“On February 18, 2011, Judge Ware granted the parties’ stipulation to dismiss 
Facebook’s DMCA claim, copyright and trademark infringement claims, and claims for 
violations of California Business and Professions Code Section 17200.”). 
412 See supra Introduction. 
413 See, generally, Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., 844 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 
2016), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 313 (2017). 
414 This could be potentially modeled after shareholder derivative lawsuits. 
415 See, e.g., Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., 721 F.3d 132, 134–35 (2d Cir. 2013) 
(vacating the class certification of people holding a copyright interest in books copied by 
Google until fair use was considered); see also Football Ass’n Premier League Ltd. v. 
YouTube, Inc., 297 F.R.D. 64, 65–66 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“Generally speaking, copyright 
claims are poor candidates for class-action treatment”). 
416 See generally Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. 
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3. Fair Use Should Be Applied Broadly to Intermediary 
Copying Online 
Because copying is so essential to the functioning of the 
Internet,417 and many uses of data scraping are arguably 
transformative,418 copyright, with its fair use analysis, could result 
in more equitable outcomes in data scraping cases. The Second 
Circuit’s decisions in Authors Guild and TVEyes recognize that 
intermediary copying is often transformative.419 As a result, the 
quantity of redistributed material and the effects on the potential 
market for the copyrighted work are the key elements of an online 
fair use analysis. In Authors Guild, the court held that despite its 
wholesale digital copying of the plaintiff’s books, Google’s 
copying was performed with a “highly transformative purpose” 
despite its commercial motivation.420 Because Google made the 
plaintiffs’ works more accessible, and constructed its snippet 
feature “in a manner that substantially protects against its serving 
as an effectively competing substitute for Plaintiffs’ books[,]” the 
court found that Google’s service was non-infringing fair use.421 
TVEyes’ service, like Google Books, involved recording 
“essentially all television broadcasts as they happen” and using 
closed captioning to create a text-searchable transcript, thus 
allowing its clients “to efficiently sort through vast quantities of 
television content in order to find clips that discuss items of 
interest to them.”422 This search feature, like Google Books, was 
held to be transformative.423 However, TVEyes also offered a 
“Watch” feature, which allowed its customers to “view up to ten-
minute, unaltered video clips of copyrighted content.”424 The court 
found that because “TVEyes ma[de] available virtually the entirety 
                                                                                                             
417 See supra Section I A. 
418 See, e.g., Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2015); Fox News 
Network, LLC v. TVeyes, Inc., 883 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2018); Perfect 10, Inc. v. 
Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1165 (9th Cir. 2007). 
419 Authors Guild, 804 F.3d at 229; TVeyes, 883 F.3d at 169. 
420 See Authors Guild, 804 F.3d at 218. 
421 See id. at 222. 
422 TVeyes, 883 F.3d at 174–75. 
423 Id. at 177. 
424 Id. 
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of the Fox programming that TVEyes users want to see and 
hear[,]” TVEyes’ Watch feature was infringing and not fair use.425  
Both of the Second Circuit’s decisions in these cases reflect the 
careful balance of copyright law, and illustrate the importance of 
copying to creation of new and innovative services online. 
4. Copyright Preempts Equivalent State Claims Involving 
Copying of Data 
Section 301 of the Copyright Act preempts state laws which 
involve “legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the 
exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright,” such that 
“no person is entitled to any such right or equivalent right in any 
such work under the common law or statutes of any State.”426 
Trespass, misappropriation, state computer crime statutes, and 
certain actions for breach of contract are preempted by the 
copyright act to the extent they attempt to create rights that are 
equivalent to those of copyright. Data scraping cases argued under 
trespass in particular often attempt to create property rights online 
in websites and web content, and should be analyzed carefully to 
determine the nature of the underlying claims. If a trespass or 
misappropriation claim argues, in essence, that a scraper copied 
data without permission, this claim should either be dismissed as 
duplicative of a CFAA claim, if one has been alleged, or as 
preempted by copyright law. 
CONCLUSION 
PowerVentures and hiQ both used data scraping of social 
media to power their services, but their uses of scraping had very 
different consequences for user privacy. hiQ’s service is 
potentially harmful to LinkedIn’s users, as it alerts their employers 
of the possibility that they may be seeking other job 
opportunities.427 PowerVentures, in contrast, expressed 
commitment to the privacy of its users, but copied users’ Facebook 
                                                                                                             
425 Id. at 179. 
426 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2012). 
427 hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., 273 F. Supp. 3d 1099, 1104 (N.D. Cal. 2017). 
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friends’ data as well as their own.428 Even if the CFAA were to be 
amended, and copyright applied in data scraping cases, these 
privacy harms would still not be redressed. 
The emergence of user-based services since the 1990s and the 
constant threat of large data breaches have led to increasing 
concerns about user privacy and security. The bargain offered by 
user-based services such as Google and Facebook is that, in 
exchange for free online services, users give these companies—
whose core business is usually advertising—the ability to use their 
data for ad targeting.429 Companies like Google, Facebook, and 
Microsoft have access to enormous amounts of personally 
identifying PII, as well as non-identifying but sensitive information 
like search history, browsing history, and private 
communications.430 User-based platforms collect large amounts of 
personal data, including “‘volunteered data’ shared intentionally by 
consumers, ‘observed data’ obtained by recording consumer 
actions online, and ‘inferred data’ derived from analyzing 
volunteered and observed data.”431 
Many of the wrongs that occur on the Internet are 
fundamentally privacy wrongs, but the U.S. sectoral model only 
protects specific kinds of data and combats specific kinds of 
harms,432 such as those that are considered “unfair and deceptive 
acts or practices,” which fall under FTC jurisdiction.433 
                                                                                                             
428 See Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., 844 F.3d 1058, 1062 (9th Cir. 
2016), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 313 (2017). 
429 Mark Hachman, The Price of Free: How Apple, Facebook, Microsoft and Google 
Sell You to Advertisers, PCWORLD (Oct. 1, 2015 3:00 AM), https://www.pcworld.com
/article/2986988/privacy/the-price-of-free-how-apple-facebook-microsoft-and-google-
sell-you-to-advertisers.html [https://perma.cc/9UQ2-ZCGY]; Jathan Sadowski, 
Companies Are Making Money from Our Personal Data – but at What Cost?, GUARDIAN 
(Aug. 31, 2016 9:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/aug/31
/personal-data-corporate-use-google-amazon [https://perma.cc/MGH5-V5FZ]. 
430 See e.g., In re Google, Inc. Privacy Pol’y Litig., No. C-12-01382-PSG, 2013 WL 
6248499, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2013); In re Facebook Internet Tracking Litig., 140 F. 
Supp. 3d 922, 927–28 (N.D. Cal. 2015). 
431 Maureen K. Ohlhausen & Alexander P. Okuliar, Competition, Consumer Protection, 
and the Right (Approach) to Privacy, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 121, 131 (2015). 
432 See supra Part II. 
433 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1). For example, the FTC has proposed that services based on user 
data implement a “privacy by design” model, which includes “providing reasonable 
security for consumer data, collecting only the data needed for a specific business 
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Commentators have suggested that the U.S. adopt a European-style 
privacy model, creating individual rights around data privacy.434 
While this type of approach would ensure privacy, any policy 
adopted by the U.S. should be tailored to overall U.S. policy goals 
and a U.S. style of governance. One way to accomplish such a 
style of governance would be to enact a federal statute that 
encourages privacy class actions. The statute would create 
statutory damages, and could potentially be based around creating 
a duty owed to users of these popular user-based services. 
 
                                                                                                             
purpose, retaining data only as long as necessary to fulfill that purpose, safely disposing 
of data no longer being used, and implementing reasonable procedures to promote data 
accuracy.” Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change: A Proposed 
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